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IS SILENCE GOLDEN WHEN IT COMES TO
AUDITING?
DARIN BARTHOLOMEW*

INTRODUCTION

Enron Corporation, an energy trading company, is embroiled
in one of the largest bankruptcy filings in United States history.1
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began
investigating Enron in October of 2001. Arthur Andersen, one of
the big-five accounting firms, was convicted for obstructing a
federal investigation because of Andersen's destruction of
documents related to its public audit of Enron.3 Arthur Andersen
has since astronomically reduced its workforce and has arranged
for the sales of segments of its accounting practice to other
accounting firms.4 Needless to say, it is questionable whether
* Darin E. Bartholomew is a Senior Attorney with Deere & Company,
currently handling intellectual property licensing and transactional matters.
He has practiced in the areas of commercial law, securities law and patent law
since 1993. Mr. Bartholomew is a graduate of Northwestern University, The
John Marshall Law School, and Georgetown University Law Center. This
article is dedicated to the memory of the late A. A. Sommer, Jr., an illustrious
attorney, professor and former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, who once said, "Fraud is impossible to eliminate - it is a part of
human nature." The author's views are solely expressed herein and are not
attributable to any corporation, business, or other entity.
1. Robert O'Harrow Jr., Creditors War Over Attorney-Enron Links, Judge
Asked to Disqualify Law Firm, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2002, at E01. Enron
was once the seventh-largest U.S. company and entered into the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history as of Dec. 2, 2001. Marcy Gordon, Former Enron
Auditor Deflects Blame, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 17, 2002), available at
http://senrs.com/former-enron-auditordeflects-blame.htm (last visited Nov.
6, 2002). Enron's bankruptcy filing was later dwarfed by WorldCom Inc. when
it filed the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in U.S. history on July 21,
2002. Jon Van, WorldCom's Troubles Top $7 Billion, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 2002,
§ 1, at 1. WorldCom Inc. disclosed over seven billion dollars in accounting
irregularities that dated from 1999 until the filing, and that resulted in
criminal fraud charges against several WorldCom executives. Id.
2. Jonathan D. Glater & Michael Brick, Ex-Official Says Enron Employees
Shredded Papers,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at Al.
3. The Fall of Andersen, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2002, § 1, at 1; David S.
Hilzenrath, Andersen's CEO to Resign, Move Comes Days After Volcker Urged
Changes at Top, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2002, at A01.
4. The Fall of Andersen, supra note 3, at 1; Susan Schmidt and David S.
Hilzenrath, Andersen to Cut Jobs, Try to Shed Non-Audit Work, WASH. POST,
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either Enron or Arthur Andersen will survive as a viable
business.'
According to THE WASHINGTON POST, an internal document
evidenced Arthur Andersen's concern about potential accounting
irregularities at Enron and outlined Andersen's considerations of
ending the business relationship as early as February 6, 2001.6
This internal document discussed the accounting treatment of
partnerships that were used to exclude Enron's true level of debt
from published financial statements.7 In addressing potential
changes to auditing, Arthur Andersen commented, "If a company
just 'squeaks by,' the auditor can go to the board of directors
through the audit committee.
But if the board supports
management's accounting choices, the auditor's only option is to
remain silent or resign."" Andersen subsequently chose to remain
silent regarding Enron's accounting practices after it debated
dropping Enron as an audit client in the February 6, 2001
document.9 In 2001, Enron paid Arthur Andersen over fifty-two
Mar. 29, 2002, at E01; The Question Remains: Will Andersen Fall?, WASH.
POST, Mar. 31, 2002, at H02.
5. The Question Remains, supra note 4, at H02. See also Press Release,
Enron Corporation, Enron Files Voluntary Petitions For Chapter 11
Reorganization; Sues Dynegy for Breach of Contract, Seeking Damages of at
Least $ 10 Billion, (Dec. 2, 2001), available at http://www.enron.comcorp/
pressroom/releases/2001/ene/PressReleasell-12-02-01letterhead
(last visited
Nov. 6, 2002). Arthur Andersen exited the public accounting business on
August 31, 2002. Consumer Spending Up 1%, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2002, at
E2.
6. Kathleen Day & Peter Behr, Andersen Considered Severing Enron Ties,
Feb. E-mail Shows Concerns About Accounting, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at
A01; Andersen's Woes Worsen Over Enron Debacle, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2002),
available at http://biz.yahoo.com/rb/020117/ businessenronandersen memo_
dcl.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
7. Andersen's Woes Worsen, supra note 6. Enron management approved
the formation of the partnerships and controlled the partnerships "to manage
its financial risk." John R. Emshwiller & Kathryn Kranhold, Publicized Letter
to Lay Involved Struggle Over Enron's Direction, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at
A4. "Enron hid its true financial picture and, most important, its true
creditworthiness from Standard & Poor's," said Ronald M. Barone, Managing
Director of Standard & Poor's Corp. Martha McNeil Hamilton, Enron Hid
Debt, Rating Agency Officials Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at A10.
8. Press Release, Patrick Dorton, Arthur Andersen Worldwide CEO
outlines additional reforms in firms U.S. audit practice, (Feb. 5, 2002),
available
at
http://andersen.com/website.nsf/content/MediaCenterNews
ReleaseArchiveAuditReforms02052002 (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
9. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson and Peter Behr, Andersen Guilty of Obstruction, Accounting Firm Will End Audit Work, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002,
at Al. Andersen approved Enron's pre-bankruptcy financial statements that
obscured billions in debt and losses. Id. On October 16, 2001 in a press
release, Enron initially disclosed the losses of the off-the-book partnerships
against Andersen's recommendations. Id. Later, on Nov. 8, 2001. Enron itself
disclosed that it was cutting reported profits by almost 600 million dollars over
five years because of accounting errors. Hamilton, supra note 7, at A10. At
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million dollars in auditing and consulting fees '° in exchange for
that "golden" silence.
Could this financial disaster have been avoided if the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002" were in effect or if different
regulatory measures were in place? First, this article will present
the regulatory scheme and the SEC's role will be reviewed.
Second, this article will propose several improvements to prevent
or discourage similar breakdowns in auditing. The proposed
improvements build on existing self-regulatory organizations and
measures for reducing the regulatory burden
represent pro-active
12
on the SEC.
Most publicly traded corporations strive to present their
financial conditions lawfully in the most favorable light to the
public.13 Sometimes, corporations make extreme financial

least one public auditor at Arthur Andersen allegedly worked in an
environment where voicing disagreement with the audit client was
discouraged. Susan Schmidt, Andersen Yanked Advisor Off Enron, Partner's
Complaints Irked Energy Firm, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2002, at E01. An auditor
at Arthur Andersen was removed from the Enron project when he disagreed
with Enron's accounting treatment and Enron later complained about him.
Id.
10. Day & Behr, supra note 6, at A01.
11. H.R. 3763, 107 Cong. (2002). Although the Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman (now former Chairman), Harvey L. Pitt, indicated that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was unnecessary, Congress approved a modified
version of the bill with an overwhelming majority of votes on July 25, 2002.
Albert B. Crenshaw, Congress Sends Corporate-Reform Bill to Bush, WASH.
POST., July 26, 2002, at A16; David S. Hilzenrath, et al., How Congress Rode a
Perfect "Storm" to Corporate Reform, WASH. POST., July 28, 2002, at A01. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act might be the most important new federal securities laws
since the Securities and Exchange Commission was created in the 1930's,
although some of the stiff criminal penalties for executives may amount to
little more than "election-year fluff." Jim VandeHei & David S. Hilzenrath,
Hill Leaders Agree on Corporate Curbs, WASH. POST., July 25, 2002, at A01;
Crenshaw, supra (quoting Columbia University law Professor John C. Coffee
Jr.).
12. Harvey Pitt, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, indicated a preference for using existing self-regulatory
organizations and increasing proactive compliance measures, rather than
enforcement activity, of the SEC. Day & Behr, supra note 6, at A01; David S.
Hilzenrath, Two SEC Views of Industry, Ex-Head Levitt Attacked; New Chief
Pitt Vows Respect, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A25. However, Former
Chairman Harvey Pitt resigned on November 5, 2002, after tergiversating in
his initial selection of the eminent John Biggs for the head of the new Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board created under the Sarbane-Oxley Act of
2002. David S. Hilzenrath, Besieged Pitt Quits as SEC Chairman, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 2002 at A2; Jane Bryant Quinn, Is Reform a Bad Joke?,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2002, at 43.
13. See, e.g., Nightly Business Report: Interview, Ralph Larsen, Chairman
of the Board and CEO, Johnson & Johnson Corporation (PBS television
broadcast, Mar. 25, 2002) transcript available at http://www.nbr.com/
ranscript/2002/trnscrpt032502.htm#STORY1 (last visited Nov. 27, 2002)
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maneuvers that fall within the scope of technical accounting rules,
but result in the press criticizing the realism of the financial
portrayals of the corporations' health.14 The incessant pressure on
corporations to increase shareholder value occasionally tests the
fringes of the accounting rules. While some corporations are able
to meet market expectations through forthright presentation of
financial statements, other corporations are not and may resort to

creative accounting that violates the federal securities laws.'" The
SEC is concerned about creative accounting; particularly where it
rises to the level of fraud or misrepresentation under the federal
securities laws. Former Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt,
recognized
that financial
performance
manipulation
of
corporations needed to be addressed squarely: "Today, American
markets enjoy the confidence of the world. How many half-truths,
and how much
accounting sleight-of-hand, will it take to tarnish
16
faith?"
that
LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MANIPULATION

During the Clinton administration, Arthur Levitt intensified
the SEC's measures against financial performance manipulation,
which is sometimes referred to as earnings management.17
Broadly defined, financial performance manipulation refers to an
issuer's manipulation or window-dressing of financial statements

(mentioning corporate governance, board governance, and accounting
principles in reference to the efforts companies must use to remain viable).
Larsoen stated:
The fact is the CEO's that I know, virtually all of them break their backs to
run clean companies and do the right thing. And we certainly try to do that at
Johnson & Johnson. So I think this raises, once again, for all of us, the need
to be alert, to be attentive, to pay attention to your business and to stay a mile
away from any practices that might be called into question.
Id.
14. Bernard Conden, Pick a Number, Any Number, FORBES, Mar. 23, 1998,
at 124. Krispy Kreme used a "synthetic lease" to artificially and lawfully
reduce on-sheet capital expenditures during 2002. Seth Lubove & Elizabeth
McDonald, Debt? Who me?, FORBES,Feb. 18, 2002, at 56. "A synthetic lease is
an off-balance sheet trick in which a corporation has all of the practical effects
of a heavily mortgaged piece of real-estate but tells its shareholders that it
neither owns the property nor owes debt on it." Id.
15. Companies that engage in creative accounting may lack sufficient
internal controls and may experience extreme financial pressure to achieve
acceptable results. HOWARD M. SCHILIT, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS; HOW TO
DETECT ACCOUNTING GIMMICKS & FRAUD IN FINANCIAL REPORTS 7, 11-12
(McGraw-Hill 1993).
16. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, The
"Numbers Game", Speech at the New York University Center for Law &
Business,
New
York,
New York (Sept.
28, 1998),
aailable at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt
(last visited
Nov. 27, 2002).
17. Id.
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that improperly exaggerates or improperly misstates the issuer's
true financial condition. If an issuer of securities publishes
misleading financial disclosure or fails to keep adequate
accounting records, the issuer may face liability for financial
performance manipulation. For example, liability for financial
performance manipulation may flow from misleading information
in a reported financial statement, press-release, or otherwise in
accordance with Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.18 In the context of a primary offering, illicit financial
performance manipulation may lead to liability because of
misleading information in a registration statement under section
11 of the Securities Act of 193319 or misleading information in a
prospectus under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.20
ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS OF THE EXCHANGE ACT

While Rule 10b-5 has dominated federal securities law over
the last several decades,21 the SEC's activities in curbing financial
performance manipulation have resulted in a number of
administrative releases that address the books and records
provision and internal accounting controls provision of the
Thus, liability for financial performance
Exchange Act.22
18. Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (2002); see, e.g., Platinum Software Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 37185, 1996 SEC LEXIS 1282 (May 9, 1996)
[hereinafter "Platinum Release"] (examining fraudulent accounting practices
in misstating revenue and net income, among other violations). Often, a
financial performance manipulation violation includes a misleading statement
in a financial report that allows a private right of action under Rule lOb-5.
See, e.g., Cendant Corporation Litigation, 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. Sept. 4,
1998) (examining a shareholder action against a corporation for the reporting
of accounting irregularities, which resulted in large decrease in stock price).
19. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). See, e.g., Cendant
Corporation Litigation, 182 F.R.D. at 146 (examining allegations by plaintiffs
of violations of the 1993 Act in conjunction with registration statements).
20. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000); see, e.g., Cendant
Corporation Litigation, 182 F.R.D. at 146 (alleging violations of 1933 Act in
conjunction with filed prospectus).
21. See generally ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER

THE SECURITIES LAWS (West Group 2002) (authoring a six volume treatise
dedicated to Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence).
22. See, e.g., Albert Glenn Yesner, Exchange Act Release No. 39916, 1998
SEC LEXIS 785 (Apr. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Yesner Release] (alleging
improper revenue recognition in order to manipulate quarterly profits with
respect to Sensormatic Electronics Corporation); Joy Lynn Schneider Green,
Exchange Act Release No. 39792, 1998 SEC LEXIS 520 (Mar. 25, 1998)
[hereinafter Green Release] (alleging improper recognition of revenue based
on back-dating and resetting of computer clocks with respect to Sensormatic
Electronics Corporation); Donnkenny, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 41012;
1999 SEC LEXIS 219 (Feb. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Donnkenny Release]
(examining the engagement in financial fraud to create an illusion of financial
results that exceeded analyst expectations of company's profits).
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manipulation is not necessarily predicated on fraud because these
accounting provisions and ethical standards of accountants
provide firm ground for SEC action."3
The books and records provision refers to section 13(b)(2)(A)
of the Exchange Act; the internal controls provision refers to
section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. 4 Collectively, sections
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act are referred to
herein as the accounting provisions of the Exchange Act. The
accounting provisions protect investors against inadequate
accounting management and procedures in the corporation that
might ultimately lead to fraudulent or misleading disclosure.
Section 13(b)(2)(A) requires an issuer to keep books and records
that accurately reflect its financial transactions and the
disposition of its assets." Section 13(b)(2)(B) requires an issuer to
develop and maintain a system of internal accounting controls that
are adequate to prepare financial statements in accordance with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP").26 If the SEC
focuses its enforcement activity on the accounting provisions, the
public may benefit because of the potential for these provisions to
deter prospective financial performance manipulation or fraud
before misleading financial disclosures are publicly disseminated
into the market.27
GAAP VIOLATIONS
Earnings management may violate GAAP or represent a too
aggressive interpretation of GAAP. 8 GAAP is generally defined by
23. Yesner Release, supra note 22, at 2; Green Release, supra note 22, at
10; Donnkenny Release, supra note 22, at 12; see, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF CERTIFIED

PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

(AICPA),

PROFESSIONAL CODE OF

CONDUCT (2001), available at http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2002) (outlining the ethical standards for accountants).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(b)(2)(A)-13(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. §
78m (2000); Platinum Release, supra note 18, at 14.
25. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000);
Green Release, supra note 22, at 13.
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000);
Green Release, supra note 22, at 10.
27. In the context of sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B), the SEC's
enforcement activity is not supplemented by civil litigation.
Sections
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) do not expressly provide for a private right of
action. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(b)(2)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(2000). Further, most courts have not found a private-right-of-action for
section 13(b)2. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
420 (3d ed. 1996) (citing McLean v. International Harvester Co., 817 F. 2d
1214 (5th Cir. 1987) and Eisenberger v. Spectex Industries, Inc., 644 F. Supp.
48 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)). Compare Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976) (recognizing a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 because of a
thirty-year precedent of judicial recognition).
28. Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, to Thomas Ray, Director, Audit and Attest
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current statements and interpretations issued by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) since 1973, some opinions
issued by the Accounting Principles Board (APB) from 1959 to
1973, some documents authored by the Committee on Accounting
Procedure from 1939 until 1959, and various documents issued by
private sector accounting bodies.29 Although the SEC primarily
defers to the private sector in developing and maintaining GAAP,
the SEC has issued regulation S-X on the form and content of
financial statements, Accounting Series Releases (ASR's) on
matters not generally addressed by the private sector, and
unofficial Staff Accounting Bulletins as guidance for disclosure
requirements." Rules 13a-1 and 13a-3 are promulgated under
section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and require section 12 issuers to
file annual and quarterly reports on Forms 10K and 10Q,
respectively, that comply with regulation S-X and GAAP. 3'
Accordingly, the SEC may address earnings management that
does not comply with GAAPunder Rules 13a-1 and 13a-3. Under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the chief executive officer and the
chief financial officer of a publicly traded company must certify
that the financial statements in the quarterly or annual report
"fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer" based on each officer's
knowledge and review of the financial report.32
GAAP provides companies with wide discretion in the
application of accounting standards so that companies are able to
run their businesses without the accounting standards unduly
interfering with business decisions. An issuer can select various
accounting policies, such as inventory method, amortization

Standards, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1 (Oct. 9, 1998)
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/aclrl009.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Turner Letter].
29. CHARLES H. MEYER, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR LAWYERS IN A
NUTSHELL 46-51 (1995).
30. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 418-419 (3d
ed. 1996).

31. Advanced Medical Products, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37649,
1996 SEC LEXIS 2274, *16-17 (Sept. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Advanced Medical
Release]. The SEC may establish a violation of the reporting requirements of
§ 13(a) of the Exchange Act without showing scienter of the wrongdoer. SEC
v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1268 (D.D.C. 1978).
32. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(A), 15 U.S.C. 78f (2000), amended
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(2002). Officers, directors and
signatories still must exercise due diligence in reviewing registration
statements (e.g., S-1, S-2, and S-3 Forms) for registered offerings of securities
to prevent misleading disclosure. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C.
77(k)(2000). In practice, section 11 liability and section 302(a) liability may
overlap because registration Forms S-2 and S-3 incorporate by reference the
company's annual report and other periodic reports filed under the Exchange
Act.
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period, and revenue recognition and still remain compliant with
GAAP.33
Some executives may be tempted to exploit the breadth of the
accounting rules to the very limits of legality. For example, vague
definitions of "one-time" and "restructuring" under the FASB rules
provide maneuvering room for creative accounting that may fall
within the literal scope of the accounting rules, but outside of the
spirit of those rules.34 If a financial report is at the fringes of
literal compliance with GAAP, the potential exists for liability
under Rule 10b-5 as a misleading financial report.
CATEGORIES OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

Corporations may lawfully manage their earnings in
compliance with GAAP. In addition, corporations may place their
financial disclosure in a favorable light that does not misrepresent
their true financial condition to investors. During Arthur Levitt's
term at the SEC, the SEC indicated that the following types of
earnings management would receive close scrutiny for potential
enforcement activity:
(1)"big bath charges;"
(2)creative acquisition accounting;
(3)"cookie jar reserves;"
(4) revenue recognition; and
(5)materiality compliance."
"Big bath charges" refer to a major one-time charge or an
accumulation of write-offs taken during a single accounting period,
which cleanse a corporation of poor financial results during the
single accounting period in order to enhance future financial
results." For example, a major one-time charge may include a
write-off for restructuring, worthless assets, lay-offs, obsolete
inventory, an acquisition, permanently impaired manufacturing
equipment, a plant closing, or otherwise.37 "Big bath charges" may
33. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 23.
34. Conden, supra note 14, at 124.
35. Levitt, supra note 16.
36. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 120-22. "If you do these [one-time charges]
right, you can really clean house," said David Halford, a senior portfolio
manager with Mosaic Funds in Madison, Wisconsin. Janet Kidd Stewart,
'One-time' items keep adding up, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 2002, § 5, at 2.
37. In 2001, JDS Uniphase Corp. took one-time charges for acquisitions and
other unusual events that facilitated reporting a 50.6 billion dollar net loss for
the fiscal year. Stewart, supra note 36, at 2. In 2001, Sears, Motorola, Baxter
International, and CNA Financial took one-time charges that together totaled
$ 8 billion. Id. at 1. In 2001, Motorola took approximately 3.2 billion dollars
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or may not be legal, depending upon the underlying
circumstances." Creative acquisition accounting may violate
in special charges for employee severance, investment impairments, fixedasset impairments, and potentially uncollectible finance receivables. Id. In
2001, CNA Financial took approximately 2.6 billion dollars in special charges
including strengthening loss reserves, restructuring, Enron-related losses and
World Trade Center losses. Id.
The financial records of General Motors (GM) provide another example
of a "big-bath charge". GM took an after-tax restructuring charge of four
billion dollars during one quarter in 1998, including closing three factories and
laying off about 3,000 workers. Conden, supra note 14, at 125. The four
billion dollar charge during a single quarter amounts to almost twenty percent
of GM's aggregate reported earnings during the last five years. Id. From the
perspective of an investor, the interpretation of GM's reported financial
performance during 1998 was at least complicated somewhat, but not
necessarily rendered misleading, by the impact of the "big bath charges." Id.
38. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 122. See also Stewart, supra note 36, at 2
(probing the corporate practice of writing off one-time charges and lumping
them into special charges to boost market and profit outlook). In examining
the present quality of corporate financial reporting:
[T]here may be a darker side, with some analysts complaining of a creeping in
the 1990's, when companies began writing off expenses [as one-time or
extraordinary charges] that previously would have been lumped into the cost
of doing business.
Accounting principles allow for some flexibility in
characterizing certain items as special charges.
Id. Determining the legality of "big bath charges" may turn on whether a
particular accounting treatment of worthless assets is proper. Levitt, supra
note 16. A worthless asset is properly written-off in one quarter, rather than
over the original depreciation period or amortization period associated with
the asset. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 120. A corporation runs afoul of GAAP
where worthless or impaired assets are written-off too slowly prior to the "big
bath" fiscal quarter. Id. GAAP generally requires a corporation to write down
the book value of assets if a permanent loss in value of the asset has occurred.
MEYER, supra note 29, at 76.
For example, the corporation may improperly delay recognizing assets as
worthless assets to intentionally time a write-off during the "big bath" quarter.
SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 121. On the other hand, a corporation may violate
GAAP where assets are mischaracterized as worthless assets or impaired
assets; hence, written-off too quickly. Id.
If a corporation accumulates charges for a "big bath" by misallocating
expenses to the wrong accounting period or improperly accelerating
depreciation expenses, the corporation may violate GAAP. Id. at 118. For
example, a corporation may improperly skew future expenses that should
really apply to at least one later accounting period to an earlier accounting
period. Id. at 120.
In particular, the corporation may attempt to pay
discretionary expenses in a current accounting period that would otherwise
fairly apply to the next accounting period. Id. at 118.
A corporation may accelerate depreciation expenses by unrealistically
shortening a depreciation period for tangible assets or an amortization period
for intangible assets. Id. at 118-19. For example, the corporation may
accelerate the write-offs of assets over a lower number of quarters than would
ordinarily be used. Consequently, an earlier quarter during the write-off
period looks grimmer than it would otherwise be, but the subsequent quarters
after the write-off period characteristically provide artificially inflated
earnings. Id. at 120. Future charges against earnings are reduced improperly
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GAAP if a corporation takes an excessive write-off of in-process
research and development. 9 For example, a corporation may
improperly treat a substantial portion of the purchase price of a
target company as an in-process research and development
expense without a realistic assessment of the target company's
actual research and development activity. 0
by the earlier write-off of assets. Id.
39. During the last decade, acquiring companies have written-off or
attempted to write off in-process research and development for the acquired
target in at least one-hundred and forty acquisitions. Lynn E. Turner, Chief
Accountant, Office of the Chief Accountant, United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Software and Service Industry Analyst
Group (Feb. 10, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
(last visited Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
speecharchive/1999/spch251.htm
Turner Software Remarks] (citing Zhen Deng & Baruch Lev, The Valuation of
Acquired R&D (Apr. 1998)). Acquiring companies may assert that almost the
entire cost of a target company can be expensed during one fiscal year as inprocess research and development. Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Financial
Executives Institute 1998 Annual Conference (Oct. 22, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch231.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Turner Financial Remarks]. For example, MCI
WorldCom wanted to write off about seven billion dollars as in-process
research and development costs for the merger between MCI and WorldCom.
Justin Gillis, Firm's Profits Survive Scrutiny of SEC Microscope, WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 1999, at El and E6. Yet, the SEC determined that MCI WorldCom
could properly write-off only 3.1 billion dollars. Id. See also MCI WORLDCOM
1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999) at 2-3 (referencing "Notes to Selected Financial
Data"). Similarly, the SEC allowed America On-line to write-off only twentyone percent of its acquisition of Mirabilis, Ltd. with the remaining amount to
be written off over the following five years. Gillis, supra, at E6. America Online was seeking to write off virtually the entire cost of acquiring Mirabilis
during the single year of the acquisition. Id. Instead of spreading the expense
of the acquisition over several years, which would be detrimental to earnings,
the drag on earnings is purged during one bad quarter upon completion of the
acquisition. Levitt, supra note 16.
40. Turner Financial Remarks, supra note 39. If an acquiring company
attempts to expense in-process research and development during a single
fiscal quarter in excess of research and development expenditures previously
reported by the acquired company, the SEC may consider the write-off
improper. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Remarks to the Financial Executives Institute, New York, New
York (Nov. 16, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/spch227.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
Levitt Financial Remarks]. The SEC may be most concerned about companies
assigning bogus valuations to acquired research and development that are
disconnected from reality or violate common sense. Turner Software Remarks,
supra note 39. Companies should properly consider the valuations and risks
Risks include
associated with the acquired research and development.
acquiring research and development that turns out to be a technical dead end.
Id. Risks also include the acquirer's ability to timely bring the completed
research and development to market. Id.
Appraisals of in-process research and development should allocate a fair
value to the existing commercial technology and associated good will of the
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Under U.S. accounting rules, a corporation may properly set
aside reserves only under limited conditions.4 For example, an
issuer may properly set aside reserves in an estimated amount
sufficient to cover a potential, foreseeable warranty liability, an
environmental liability, a tax liability or another estimated
liability for later inclusion in earnings. 42 "Cookie jar reserves"
refer to liberal use of reserves that lawfully or improperly shift
sales revenue from an earlier accounting period to a laterdesignated accounting period.43

acquired company. Id. In most cases, existing commercial technology and its
underlying intellectual property should have a greater value than in-progress
improvements on the existing commercial technology. Id. After all, the
prospective market for a technological improvement is generally uncertain in
comparison to the actual market for an existing product. Id. The value of inprocess research and development may be estimated based on the cost to the
acquiring company to independently develop the ultimate project involving the
in-process research and development, rather than acquiring the research and
development from the acquired company. Id. Valuations of the research and
development should not conflict with presentations made to the board of
directors or recorded in the corporate minutes. Id. Management's due
diligence of the acquired company should support the valuation of the inprocess research and development, rather than conflict with the subsequent
expensing by management. Id.
41. Improper reserves may be referred to formally as improper liability
accruals.
Improper liability accruals are either not foreseeable or not
quantifiable in amount as required by FASB Statement No. 5. Inflated
reserves, in effect, improperly delay the recording of revenue until after the
accounting period in which the issuer earned the revenue. The latest time for
properly recognizing revenue of a product may be upon expiration of a
warranty and in the absence of a risk of the buyer returning the product.
MEYER, supra note 29, at 67.
Inflated reserves that do not comply with FASB Statement No. 5 may be
used to improperly smooth out earnings by saving excessive earnings during
good times in preparation for bad financial times so that a continuous pattern
of earnings growth can be presented to the public. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at
113; Turner Financial Remarks, supra note 39.
42. Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant, Division of Enforcement of the
SEC, Remarks at the Nineteenth Annual Ray Garrett, Jr., Corporate and
Securities Law Institute, The Corporate Counsel Center of Northwestern
University School of Law (Apr. 22, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch276.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002)
[hereinafter "Schuetze Securities Remarks"].
43. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 112. Turner Letter, supra note 28. The
FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 94-3 and 95-3 may be used to
justify setting aside "cookie jar reserves" in the context of restructuring or a
merger. Schuetze Securities Remarks, supra note 42. EITF 94-3 permits
recognition of involuntary termination benefits as a proper loss accrual
liability to be paid to laid-off employees and recognizes future expenditures as
proper loss accrual liabilities that are directly associated with a plan to exit an
activity, if the termination benefits will have no future benefit and if other
conditions are satisfied. Id. EITF 95-3 applies to acquisitions and permits
recognition of expenses to relocate employees as a proper loss accrual liability.
Id. The incentive to rely on EITF 94-3 is bolstered by a prohibition against
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Revenue recognition problems refer to the premature
counting of sales."
Revenue should be recognized once the
earnings procedure is complete and an exchange has occurred,
except for long-term contracts in which the percentage of
completion method is used. " In an egregious case of revenue
recognition involving Sensormatic Corporation, Walter P.
Schuetze, former Chief Accountant for the Division of Enforcement
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, remarked
appropriately that "Sensormatic's income statement should have

general reserves in FASB Statement No. 5.
In Jan. of 1999, a former auditor of Microsoft Corporation alleged that
Microsoft Corporation improperly used "cookie jar reserves."
Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Microsoft Says SEC is Probing Its Practices, WASH. POST,
July 1, 1999, at E3. Microsoft announced on June 30, 1999, that the SEC
began an investigation of Microsoft Corporation's accounting practices with
respect to reserves. Id. The SEC was still investigating Microsoft's use of
reserves as of the 10Q filed on Dec. 31, 2001. MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
FORM 10Q FOR MICROSOFT CORPORATION FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED

DEC. 31, 2001 (2002) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl
speecharchive/1998/spch231.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) (referring to Part
1, Financial Information, "Notes to Financial Statement"). Microsoft has
historically established reserves exceeding twenty percent of sales revenue of
software products to cover the costs of technical support and customer
support. Chandrasekaran, supra. During the time when the reserves were
established, Microsoft developed a strong reputation as a company that has
consistently met or exceeded the earnings consensus of analysts. Id.
44. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 34. An issuer improperly recognizes revenue
if the issuer ships goods before a sales contract or agreement has been reached
with a customer, or even after a customer has canceled an order. Turner
Financial Remarks, supra note 39, at 2. Manufacturer-issuers may have a
sense of urgency to ship out as many products as possible toward the end of
the year, or even at the end of each quarter, to meet a sales quota. Id.
An issuer may prematurely record revenue when the completion of a sales
transaction is contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain event. SCHILIT,
supra note 15, at 34. For example, if the buyer is likely to return goods or not
pay for the goods, the shipment of goods should not be recognized as revenue.
Id. at 39. See FASB Statement No. 48 that defines when revenue recognition
is proper in the context of a buyer's right to return a product.
The revenue cannot be recognized where the customer's payment depends
upon obtaining financing or resale to a third party if the issuer's receipt of
payment is dubious at best. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 42.
An issuer may prematurely record revenue when future services are
incomplete or owed to the purchaser as a condition for the purchaser's
payment. Turner Financial Remarks, supra note 39. The issuer may have an
obligation to provide installation services or other ancillary services prior to
the purchaser's duty to pay arises. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 43; Turner
Financial Remarks, supra note 39. If the issuer receives an advance payment
for the performance of future services, the issuer may properly allocate the
prepaid funds to unearned revenue, which represents a liability until the
services are performed, at which time the prepaid funds are recognized as
earned revenue. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 44-46.
45. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 34-36.
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been headed up as follows: 'Year ended June 35, 1994.' 4
Materiality abuse refers to any accounting technique that
improperly or lawfully distorts actual financial results by a
quantitative percentage that is said to be too minuscule to
matter.4 7 For example, accountants may intentionally record
errors that are within a certain margin to pick up a few cents of
quarterly earnings. If some accountants and corporations fail to
fix known financial errors or intentionally create such errors and
label them immaterial, those accountants are at risk for SEC
enforcement activity that may seek to maximize the scope of
materiality. 9
46. Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant, Division of Enforcement, U.S.

Securities and Exchange Commissioner, Remarks at the 1998 Twenty-Sixth
Annual AICPA National Conference on SEC Developments (Dec. 8, 1998),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/ spch241.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Schuetze SEC Remarks].
47. Levitt, supra note 16. The SEC states that the proper standard for
materiality should be based primarily on qualitative factors, or both
quantitative and qualitative factors, but not quantitative factors alone.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 17
C.F.R. 211 (2002) (amended Aug. 12, 1999). Accordingly, a quantitatively
small misstatement may become material if warranted by a particular
qualitative circumstance, including whether the misstatement masks a change
in an earnings trend, hides a failure to meet analysts' consensus expectations,
or transforms a loss into income. Id. Even if an intentional misstatement is
immaterial, a corporation may violate section 13(b)2 of the Exchange Act for
failing to keep accurate books, records and accounts in reasonable detail that
fairly reflect transactions and dispositions of assets of the corporation. Id.
According to the SEC, compliance with the books and records provision is not
judged under materiality, but under a higher standard based on the level of
detail and degree of assurance that would satisfy a prudent man in the
conduct of his own affairs. Id.
The courts have defined materiality consistently with the SEC's foregoing
interpretation. The Supreme Court has broadly defined disclosure as material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider
the disclosure important to his investment decision. T.S.C. Industries, Inc., v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Further, the Supreme Court has
also defined material as referring to information that, if published, would
affect the total mix of information available about an issuer's financial
condition. Id.
The judiciary generally embraces more of a qualitative standard of
materiality than accountants do. In practice, accountants tend to define
materiality as less than five percent of net income, net loss, or assets. MEYER,
supra note 29, at 64. Certain FASB statements state that the accounting
requirements do not need to be applied literally if the failure to follow the
requirements would not be material, but according to the SEC the "FASB has
long emphasized that materiality cannot be reduced to a numerical formula."
Staff Accounting Bulletin, supra. If supported by an FASB statement with an
immateriality escape hatch, accountants may ignore the technically correct
treatment of a particular accounting entry for an immaterial error. MEYER,
supra note 29 at 63.
48. Levitt, supra note 16.
49. Id. In a settlement of SEC enforcement actions against Arthur
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Can corporations manage earnings without making use of the
earnings management techniques that the SEC staff has identified
as candidates for possible enforcement activity? Yes, the nature of
GAAP has flexibility that may be exploited in numerous ways.50
When the SEC and the FASB lock and bolt one door, corporate
executives may open up another to manage earnings, either
lawfully or improperly. Corporations may see an open door to
skew earnings by adding pension plan gains to income and
ignoring stock option costs."1
Changes in inventory and
restructuring charges represent unlocked doors that invite
earnings management. 2 Recently, Enron used partnerships called
Anderson and its partners for Andersen's auditing of Waste Management's
financial reports, the partners of Andersen were unable to justify as
immaterial the inflated income in the 1993 and 1995 financial reports under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. Press Release, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Arthur Andersen LLP Agrees to Settlement
Resulting in First Antifraud Injunction in More than 20 Years and LargestEver Civil Penalty ($7 Million) In SEC Enforcement Action Against a Big Five
Accounting Firm (June 19, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
headlines/andersenfraud.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
Andersen Release].
In 1993, correction of current and prior-period
misstatements would have reduced income by twelve percent before special
items. Id. at 4. In 1995, a Practice Director at Andersen incorrectly reasoned
that (1) netting of prior-expenses against a recent gain and (2) nondisclosure
of the misstatements of the prior-expenses were not material to Waste
Management's 1995 financial statements when taken as a whole. Id. at 5.
The SEC found that the netting and misstatements were material to the 1995
audit report, although the netting only represented approximately ten percent
of pre-tax income before special charges. Id. In both 1993 and 1995, one or
more partners incorrectly determined that the above misstatements in income
were immaterial and that Andersen could issue an unqualified report on the
financial statements. Id.
50. SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 6.
51. Elizabeth McDonald & Daniel Kruger, More Ploys, FORBES, Mar. 4,
2002, at 106.
52. SCHILIT, supra note 15. For example, manufacturing companies can
manage earnings by switching from a last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory
method to a first-in, first-out (FIFO) inventory method during inflationary
periods. Id. at 23-24. If the unit price of a manufactured good increases over
time, the issuer switches to the first-in, first-out inventory method to realize
the price differential between the current manufacturing cost and the past
manufacturing cost of the good, until all of the old, lower-priced goods are
shipped. Id.
Restructuring charges are loosely defined under GAAP and offer further
opportunities for lawful earnings management. Conden, supra note 14.
Restructuring charges refer to one-time losses for non-continuing activities.
SCHILIT, supra note 15, at 74. Non-continuing activities include discontinued
operations, extraordinary gains or losses, and changes in accounting
principles. Id. at 74. Operating income should not be commingled with
nonrecurring charges or gains. Id. at 70. Issuers may violate GAAP by hiding
operating losses under non-continuing losses or gains. Id. at 75. Conversely,
issuers may violate GAAP by adding nonrecurring income from the sales of
assets to operating income. Id. at 73.
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"special purpose entities" to conceal its true debt load from
creditors and investors.""
SEC

ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

Thus, as evidenced above, corporations have available
numerous methods to manage their financial appearance in a way
that is technically legal, but not completely forthright. The
legitimacy of financial accounting and reporting are currently
enforced by the SEC,54 which brings administrative proceedings
and civil enforcement actions.55
Recent SEC enforcement
proceedings illustrate such lapses in financial reporting as:
(1) liability
reserves;

for

misleading

disclosure

on

"cookie

jar

53. Burton Malkiel, WatchDogs and Lapdogs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at
A16. The SEC must complete a study and prepare a report on the amount of
off-balance sheet transactions of issuers, the extent to which special purpose
entities facilitate off balance sheet transactions, and whether GAAP or SEC
rules require adequate and transparent disclosure of the off-balance sheet
transactions. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. 78m (1934),
amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(c) (2002).
54. Presently, the SEC annually pursues administrative proceedings or
federal cases against 0.3 percent to 0.6 percent of reporting companies on
matters involving accounting, financial statements, Management's Discussion
and Analysis (MD&A) disclosure, auditing issues, and disclosure. Schuetze
SEC Remarks, supra note 46.
55. The SEC has authority to bring an administrative proceeding and/or a
civil action in federal court for violations of the federal securities laws. For
example, the SEC may bring cease-and-desist administrative proceedings as
authorized under § 21C of the 1934 Act and § 8A of the 1933 Act. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2000) and Securities Act of
1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2000).
56. See, e.g., Cendant Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 42933, 2000
SEC LEXIS 1237 (June 14, 2000) [hereinafter "Cendant Release"]. In the
past, government regulators were concerned about the failures of banks to
allocate sufficient reserves to influence current income. SCHILIT, supra note
15, at 94. In 1998, the SEC filed an action against W.R. Grace in federal court
in Miami, alleging that W.R. Grace improperly bolstered earnings with
general-purpose reserves. Ann Davis, SEC Case Claims Profit 'Management'
by Grace, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1999, at C1. The SEC was primarily concerned
with the National Medical Care Inc. unit of W.R. Grace. Id. During the early
1990's, Brian J. Smith, Grace's C.E.O., allegedly ordered the National Medical
Care Unit to report earnings only to a cap and to place all earnings exceeding
the cap into a reserve account. Id. In 1992, W.R. Grace allegedly allocated at
least 50 million dollars to reserves. Id. W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 41578, 1999 SEC LEXIS 1299 (June 30, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/adminl/34-41578.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002)
[hereinafter "Grace Release"]. When earnings slowed in the first quarter of
1994, W. R. Grace allegedly took 5.4 million dollars from the reserves to
bolster earnings. Davis, supra note 56, at C1 and C20. According to the SEC,
the executives of W.R. Grace were paid bonuses on figures that were
inconsistent with W.R. Grace's reported earnings. The executives of W. R.
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7
(2) the prevalence of revenue recognition problems;1
58
(3) liability for fraudulent financial statements;

Grace were paid bonuses on the actual level of earnings of the National
Medical Care Unit, but a lower level of earnings was incorrectly reported in
the financial reports because of the reserves. Id. The SEC found that W.R.
Grace failed to keep accurate books and records that accurately reflected
transactions in violation of section 12(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act because
W.R. Grace maintained general reserves without a probable and reasonably
estimable future liability, counter to the GAAP requirement. Grace Release,
supra.
57. A substantial majority of the SEC enforcement of earnings management
SEC enforcement cases involve improper revenue recognition. Lynn Turner,
Chief Accountant, SEC, Remarks at the Colorado State Society of Certified
Public Accountants, 1998 SEC Conference (Dec. 3, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch243.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter "Turner Colorado Remarks"]. Sensormatic is one
example of an SEC administrative proceeding illustrating improper revenue
recognition among other things.
Sensormatic Electronics Corporation,
Exchange Act Release No. 39791, 53 S.E.C. 488, 489, 492-93 (Mar. 25, 1998)
[hereinafter Sensormatic Release]. The improper revenue recognition involved
allegedly turning back a computer clock for recording shipments to wrongfully
extend the duration of each quarter during a two-year period. Id. at 493.
Further, the respondents recognized revenue improperly at the time of
shipment, rather than at the time of receipt by the customer for certain free on
board (F.O.B.) shipments. Id. at 494. According to the SEC, Sensormatic
"improperly recognized revenue in order to manipulate its quarterly revenue
and earnings to reach its budgeted earnings goals and thereby meet analyst's
quarterly earnings projections." Green Release, supra note 22, at 3. In the
Green administrative hearing, the SEC noted that "[Sensormatic's] financial
statements were not in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP") and misstated Sensormatic's earnings". Id. at 4.
(emphasis added). Sensormatic's periodic reports on its Form 10K and Form
10Q overstated income by a staggering 38.3% for the third quarter of 1995,
meeting the definition of material by any standards. Id. at 7.
During 1994 through July 10, 1995, Sensormatic allegedly manipulated
its revenue to meet analysts' expectations within one cent. Sensormatic
Release, supra note 57. The President and C.E.O. of Sensormatic, Ronald G.
Assaf, signed annual reports that he knew were misleading in violation of
section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, and 13b2-1.
Id. at 9. Assaf had to pay a civil fine of $ 50,000. Id. Other executives at
Sensormatic were held liable for fraud under Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act and
section 17(a) of the '33 Act, for falsifying accounting records under Exchange
Act of 1934 Rules 13b2-1, 13b2-2 and 13b-5, and for making
misrepresentations to auditors under Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13b2-2. Id.
58. See, e.g., Cendant Release, supra note 56.
Livent concerns both
financial performance manipulation and outright fraud.
Livent, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 40937, 53 S.E.C. 1220 (Jan. 13, 1999) [hereinafter
Livent Release]. The financial performance manipulation in Livent represents
blatant, deceitful violations of accounting standards, rather than cleverly
crafted attempts to fall technically within the letter of the law. Even though
certain theatrical performances were in reality losing money, Livent projected
an image of a relatively successful operation to analysts. Id. at 1226. The
fraud was so pervasive that after the fraud was revealed, Livent's stock price
lost most of its value. Id. at 1223.
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(4) wide-spread application of the accounting provisions,
section 13(b)(2)(A) and section 13(b)(2)(B), of the Exchange
Act for curtailing earnings management abuses; 9

From 1994 until 1998, Livent's Chairman and C.E.O. (Drabinsky) and a
director (Gottlieb), allegedly manipulated Livent's books to understate
expenses and to overstate earnings. Id. at 1226. Pre-production costs,
including advertising costs of theatrical performances, were incorrectly
characterized as fixed assets concerning the construction of theaters so that
the pre-production costs could be written-off over a greater time span to inflate
earnings. Id. While pre-production costs can be properly amortized over a
maximum period of five years, fixed assets can be depreciated properly over a
maximum of forty years or their applicable useful life. Id. Livent allegedly
inflated earnings by using an improperly protracted depreciation period,
instead of a shorter amortization-period in derogation from GAAP. Id.
Livent allegedly removed expenses from its general ledger and reentered
them as if they properly belonged in the next fiscal quarter to bolster earnings
for the present fiscal quarter. Id. Livent supposedly transferred costs among
different shows to increase the amortization period for certain costs. Id. at
1227. Livent maintained two sets of books, the quintessential indicator of
fraud, to track the deletions and movement of expenses from one quarter to
the next. Id. Further, Livent maintained two sets of books to track the shifts
in costs among different theatrical performances to improperly exploit the
amortization periods. Id. According to the SEC during 1996, Livent
understated expenses by over 18 million dollars using the foregoing
manipulative techniques. Id. at 1227.
Livent improperly recognized revenue from an agreement that did not
represent a complete sale of real property rights to Dundee Realty
Corporation. Id. at 1234. According to the SEC, the revenue could not be
recognized properly under GAAP because Livent entered into a separate secret
agreement from the sale of real property with Dundee Reality Corporation
that allowed the sale to be renegotiated. Id. at 1235. Livent concealed the
existence of the separate agreement from Livent's auditors to include the sales
price as recognizable revenue in 1997. Id.
59. See, e.g., Cendant Release, supra note 56. In addition to the widely
used Rule lOb-5 that covers misstatements on Forms 10-K and 10-Q of the
1934 Act reports, sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) are pertinent where an
issuer's books are inaccurate or where an issuer lacks adequate internal
accounting controls. Green Release, supra note 22. Armed with sections
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B), the SEC pursued an administrative hearing
against Thomas H. Pike, who served as Director of Management Information
Services, and, at one point, Director of U.S. Operations for Sensormatic.
Thomas H. Pike, Exchange Act Release No. 39793, 1998 SEC LEXIS 500 (Mar.
25, 1998) [hereinafter Pike Release]. Pike was a certified public accountant,
licensed in Florida, but his primary responsibility as Director of the
Management Information Services included managing Sensormatic's computer
and information systems. Id. From February of 1994 until April of 1995, Pike
served as Sensormatic's Director of U.S. operations, which included
responsibility over the general accounting operations and records for financial
statements. Id. At the end of one or more quarters, Pike allegedly received
internal Sensormatic memoranda estimating the amount of revenue needed to
meet its quarterly revenue goal. Id. Thus, Pike allegedly had access to
information that would enable him and his employees to extend a fiscal
quarter by a planned amount to meet the sales goal and meet analyst
projections. Pike allegedly instructed his employees to turn back a computer
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(5) lapses of judgment of inside accountants and senior
management;" and

clock to falsify shipping dates that should have been outside of a fiscal quarter.
Id.
The SEC found that Pike violated Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 and sections
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. The
SEC was careful in its selection of language with respect to the interpretation
of the foregoing rules so as to indicate negligence is sufficient for culpability.
Scienter is not required for a violation of section 13(b)(2). SEC v. World-Wide
Coin Investments, 567 F.Supp. 724, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (cited with approval
in Advanced Medical Release, supra note 31.) In the SEC's interpretation of
Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13, the SEC noted that Pike "knew or should have known
that the company recorded and reported revenue on the out-of-period
shipments based on the backdated shipping documents." Pike Release, supra
note 59 (emphasis added). Similarly, the SEC found that Pike violated
sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act because "Pike knew,
or should have known, that his role in resetting the computer clock would
result in the falsification of Sensormatic's books and records, and the
subversion of existing internal controls." Id. (emphasis added).
The SEC's interpretation of negligence is entirely consistent with the
plain meaning of section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. In particular,
section 13(b)(7) explains that "reasonable detail" under section 13(b)(2)(A) and
"reasonable assurances" under section 13(b)(2)(B) refer to "such a level of
detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct
of their own affairs." Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 13(b)(2)7, 15 U.S.C. §
78m (2000). The foregoing language is particularly reminiscent of the due
diligence or heightened negligence standard under section 11(c) of the 1933
Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Nevertheless,
negligence gives way to intent for criminal liability to apply under section
13(b)(2), as set forth in 13(b)(5). Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(b)(2),
13(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).
60. Paul Hiznay, Exchange Act Release No. 42934, at § V (June 14, 2000),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-42934.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2002) (discussing the actions taken by management in order to
ensure that company profits met Wall Street predictions); Robert G. Kutsenda,
Exchange Act Release No. 44448, at § III (June 19, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44448.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002)
(examining Arthur Andersen's reporting of financial statements of Waste
Management). See, e.g., Mary Sattler Polverari, Exchange Act Release No.
42936, at § V (June 14, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/34-42936.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002) (examining the actions of
financial reporters and their involvement in accounting schemes designed to
make company profits meet the results predicted by Wall Street analysts). The
W.R. Grace administrative proceedings involved poor judgment of the Grace
senior management and internal accountants. W. R. Grace & Co., Litigation
Release No. 16008, 1998 SEC LEXIS 2765 at *3 (Dec. 22, 1998); Grace
Release, supra note 56, at § IV. Once the National Medical Care, Inc., a
subsidiary of Grace, transferred funds from the stockpiled reserves to increase
Grace's earnings per share, the former Grace senior management and the
accountants, Smith, Sukenik and Armstrong, allegedly mischaracterized the
source of the increase in Grace's earning per share. Id. at § III.A.3. In
particular, the management and accountants described the transfer as
emanating from "a change in accounting estimate." Id. at § III.A.4.c. Thus,
the SEC found that the accountants and former Grace senior management
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(6) lack of independence or at least stalwart objectivity of
outside auditors.61
This article will primarily consider the role of the public
auditors and in-house accountants in the SEC enforcement
activities, in its proposal of changes to be made.
AUDITOR OBJECTIVITY IN

W. R.

GRACE

The published circumstances surrounding W. R. Grace"
provide insight into the real-world problems associated with
auditing financial statements. Price Waterhouse, the responsible
auditor, initially informed W.R. Grace that its use of reserves was
improper, but later allegedly backed down, relying on an
accounting technicality, sometimes referred to as quantitative
materiality, to support management's view at W.R. Grace.63 To
check for quantitative materiality, auditors first calculate
management's desired accounting entries and, secondly, calculate
or estimate the technically correct accounting entries. If the
differential between the correct and management's less precise
accounting entries is immaterial, the auditors might approve the
financial statement containing potentially less accurate entries
advocated by management.64 The Price Waterhouse auditors
change-of-heart endorsement of management's incorrect entries
epitomizes a lack of stalwart objectivity that tarnishes the
auditing profession. Ironically, Chairman Levitt announced that
the accounting technicality used by W.R. Grace, "non-material"
adjustments, was among the top priorities for enforcement in his
much-publicized speech."

violated sections 10(b), 13(a), and 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act and
corresponding Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13. Id. at § IV.
61. William F. Moody, Exchange Act Release No. 36700, 1996 SEC LEXIS
14 *16 (Jan. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Moody Release] (finding that Moody caused
ACC to misstate financial information); Davis, supra note 56, at C1
(discussing creative management of financial information of the corporation).
See, e.g., Andersen Release, supra note 49 (finding Andersen's reports for
Waste Management to be false and misleading).
62. Davis, supra note 56, at C1.
63. Id.
64. To justify their conduct, the auditors may also seek to characterize the
incorrect entry as an error rather than an irregularity as defined in Statement
on Auditing Standard No. 82, "Consideration of Fraud and Financial
Statement Audit." See Eugene F. Gaughan, Exchange Act Release No. 41580,
1999 SEC LEXIS 1292 *12 (June 30, 1999) [hereinafter "Gaughan Release"]
(examining whether financial statements failed to comply with auditing
standards).
65. Levitt, supra note 16. A non-material adjustment refers to the practice
where accountants slant financial statements toward consistent earnings to an
extent that the slanted financial information is not quantitatively material,
roughly being between five to ten percent change in earnings. Pat Flannery,
Symington Hyped Assets to Accountants, Judge Told, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
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SENSORMATIC PROCEEDING

of
an
alleged
breakdown
Sensormatic
illustrates
Sensormatic's internal accounting procedures orchestrated under
the direction of high-level inside accountants, presumably under
extreme pressure to achieve certain financial results." Under
such circumstances, the SEC can invoke Rule 102(e), as well as
Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 of the Exchange Act. Rule 102(e) permits
the SEC to temporarily suspend or permanently bar accountants
from practicing before the SEC.67 The SEC may invoke Rule 102(e)
if an accountant:
(1) lacks the qualifications to represent a client before the
SEC;
(2) lacks a sufficient character or integrity;
(3) engages in improper or unethical professional conduct as
defined by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA"), or
(4) willfully violates or aids and abets a violation of the
securities laws or rules. 8
Green was a certified public accountant and Sensormatic's
June 24, 1997, at Al; Melody Petersen, Cleaning Up in the Dark; Companies

Disclose Little About Costs of Toxic Sites, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1998, at D1.
However, the SEC and federal courts have always defined such materiality
loosely to encompass qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of materiality.
The true materiality standard considers any amount material if the
information would be reasonably likely to be considered important by an
investor in making a voting, sales, or purchase decision concerning a security.
See generally T.S.C. Industries, 426 U.S. at 445 (explaining that materiality is
interpreted as the weight that a fact would place on a reasonable investor's
judgment concerning the company). If National Medical Care was regarded as
a separate segment for purposes of the MD & A, the shift in earnings of the
National Medical Care Unit was arguably material. Gaughan Release, supra
note 64, at 6-7.
66. Sensormatic Release, supra note 57.
67. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1999) (including amendment to Rule 102(e) of
the Commissioner's Rules of Practice, File No. 57-16-98 (Oct. 19, 1999)). The
SEC's authority under Rule 102(e) has been upheld to preserve the integrity of
its processes. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 579 (2d Cir. 1979);
MARC

1.

STEINBERG,

CORPORATE

AND

SECURITIES

MALPRACTICE

171

(Practising Law Institute 1992).
68. STEINBERG, supra note 67, at 171. Under the supervision of the SEC,
the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), rather than
the AICPA, is responsible for establishing or adopting ethical rules, auditing
rules, quality control rules, independence rules and other standards that apply
to "the preparation of audit reports for issuers." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §
101(c)(2) (2002). However, the PCAOB may adopt ethical and other rules from
the AICPA or "standards proposed by one or more professional groups of
accountants" that are "designated or recognized by the Board, by rule, for such
purpose." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 103(a)(1)-(a)(3)(A) (2002).
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Controller of U.S. operations during the foregoing financial
performance manipulation.69 If a controller knows about improper
revenue recognition in violation of GAAP and fails to inform the
audit committee of the issuer's board of directors or the auditor
about it, the controller may be held liable under Rules 13b2-1 and
13b2-2, among other Rules of the Exchange Act."0 Green's alleged
liability under Exchange Act Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 was
regarded as a willful violation because Green supposedly knew
that the computer clock was turned back to fraudulently change
shipping dates and deliberately withheld documents and
information from the independent auditors.7
In fact, Green
allegedly hid documents with information requested by the
auditors in her desk during the fiscal year 1995 audit. Further,
Green was subjected to Rule 102(e) proceedings for allegedly
willfully violating Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2, regardless of any
purported ethical misconduct under the AICPA Professional Code
of Conduct."
During 1994, Albert Yesner, a certified public accountant,
was Controller of Sensormatic 4 According to the SEC's initial
understanding, Yesner allegedly told an employee that his choices
were to withhold documents from the auditors or quit." Yesner
later testified that he believed that the documents were going to be
turned over to the outside auditor (Ernst and Young) by the
responsible parties at Sensormatic 6 If an in-house officer or
accountant actively conceals accounting irregularities from
auditors, the accountant may be disciplined under Rule 102(e) and
found liable for aiding and abetting in violation of sections
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." If an accounting officer becomes aware of an accounting
irregularity, such as improper recognition of revenue, the
accounting officer should report the irregularity to the audit
committee of the issuer's board of directors 8
Further, the
accounting officer should inform the independent auditors of any
material accounting irregularities during the annual audit. 9
However, in a subsequent administrative hearing the SEC
dismissed Yesner's violation of Rule 102(e) because Yesner lacked
69.
70.
71.
72.

Green Release, supra note 22, at 3.
Yesner Release, supra note 22, at 3.
Green Release, supra note 22, at 14.
Pike Release, supra note 59, at 9-10.

73. Id. at 10.
74. Yesner Release, supra note 22, at 1.

75. Id. at 2-3.
76. Albert Glenn Yesner, Initial Decision Release No. 184 (May 22, 2001)
[hereinafter Yesner Initial Release].
77. Green Release, supra note 22, at 4, 14.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 4.
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the requisite scienter or recklessness in inferring that the auditors
had received all requested documents."0
"Yesner believed the
matter was resolved when E & Y (Ernst and Young) signed off on
the audit without mention in its report or to the audit committee
that requested documents were not received or that management
had been uncooperative."'"
LVENT PROCEEDING

Livent demonstrates something more egregious than the lack
of internal controls or the overly aggressive use of accounting
standards." The senior management at Livent allegedly took on
the active role of approving accounting manipulations and finetuning fraudulent financial records and statements. 3 The Senior
Vice President of Finance, Ekstein, supposedly ordered that
records of both the manipulations and the true accounting figures
be kept. 4 Ekstein also allegedly implemented what are best
described as computer-assisted-fraud (CAF) computer programs at
Livent. These programs allowed the accounting staff to make
changes in the accounting records with the changes appearing as if
they were original and correct entries.
The above fraudulent
accounting manipulations were concealed from Livent's auditors. 7
Thus, auditor independence was not an issue because the auditors
were not aware of the fraud.
Livent violated Rules 13(a) and 13(b) among other rules
because Livent failed to maintain a system of adequate internal
accounting controls to facilitate compliance with GAAP. Livent
violated Rule 10b-5 because the financial performance
manipulation resulted in multiple misstatements made to analysts
and filed in various annual reports on a Form 20-F and quarterly
reports on Form 6-K, as well as a registration statement on a
Form F-1. 8
MOODY PROCEEDING

Moody involves the SEC's enforcement activity against an
executive of American Aircraft Corporation (A.A.C.) for financial
performance manipulation. " Moody demonstrates the SEC's

80.
81.
82.
83.

Yesner Initial Release, supra note 76, at 93-94.
Id. at 96.
Livent Release, supra note 58.
Id. at 1226-28.

84. Id. at 1227.
85. Id. at 1228.
86. Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1236-40.
Moody Release, supra note 61, at 1-3.
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willingness to hold corporate executives accountable for failing to
maintain adequate internal controls or accounting procedures.91
Moody's failure to hire an accountant squarely falls under Rule
13(b)(2)(B) that requires an issuer to maintain a system of
adequate internal controls which are sufficient to permit
preparation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP.92
Moody includes a GAAP violation that resulted in a material
overstatement of assets and a material understatement of losses in
the quarterly Form 10Q's and the annual financial statements on
Form 10K from 1988 to 1991. 93 In particular, A.A.C. materially
understated its net losses by over one million dollars for one fiscal
year because A.A.C. capitalized research and development costs as
production tooling, instead of expensing the research and
development costs.94
In the Moody proceeding, the SEC chastised Moody for failing
to hire a capable accountant to prepare A.A.C.'s financial
statements, even though A.A.C. ultimately did have the financial
statements approved by an auditor.9" Nevertheless, it was alleged
that Moody intentionally misrepresented to the auditor that
A.A.C. had progressed beyond the research and development
phase of the helicopter project in management representation
96
letters.
C.E.O. Moody allegedly disagreed with the auditor's
accounting treatment of tooling costs and prototype costs. 97 The
auditor correctly told Moody that tooling costs and prototype costs
should be expensed as incurred. 9 However, Moody argued that
the tooling costs should be capitalized because the tooling could be
used if a helicopter was ever manufactured in the future.99 Moody
"persuaded A.A.C.'s auditor to agree that A.A.C. could report the R
& D costs as assets even after A.A.C.'s auditor told Moody that

91. Id. at 12-14.
92. Id. at 15-16.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Id. at 5-6.
95. Id. at 14.
96. Id. The Moody proceeding was held before the new prohibition on an
officer's improper influence on the conduct of audits. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 303(a) (2002). The SEC's proposed rules for implementing section
303(a) discount the presence of the words "fraudulently influence" and seek
broad liability under a negligence standard for officer's and for "any other
person acting under the direction thereof', "if that person knew or was
unreasonable in not knowing that such action could, if successful, result in
rendering such financial statements materially misleading." Proposed Rule:
Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Release No. 34-46685, File No. S739-02 (Oct. 18, 2002) (quoting proposed rule § 240.13b-2-2), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-46685.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
97. Moody Release, supra note 61, at 8, 13.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 6-7.
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such costs should be expensed."' 0 Similarly, "A.A.C.'s auditor,
acceding to Moody's belief, instructed A.A.C.'s bookkeeper to
adjust A.A.C.'s accounting records and financial statements to
capitalize the prototype's cost as inventory for fiscal years 1990
and 1991. ''
Thus, the auditor lacked the stalwart objectivity to stand his
ground against C.E.O. Moody, who argued for incorrect changes in
the accounting presentation of the financial statements to achieve
better financial results." 2 The auditor approved A.A.C.'s financial
statement that improperly capitalized and depreciated the related
tooling and prototype expenses, which resulted in an
overstatement of income.0 ' The tooling expenses and prototype
expenses should have been expensed during the quarters in which
they were incurred.0 4 As illustrated in the W.R. Grace and Moody
proceedings, the alleged lack of independence of auditors may
reflect more of an absence of stalwart objectivity of auditors,
rather than any intentional wrongdoing on the auditors' part.
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON

According to a recent WALL STREET JOURNAL article, Arthur
Andersen failed to flag Enron's financial problems in audits and
failed to adequately address Enron's use of partnerships that kept
debt off of Enron's balance sheet to inflate earnings. 0 5 In
congressional testimony, Andersen Chief Executive Officer (now
former C.E.O.), Joseph Berardino, testified, "in one case, Andersen
had made an error in judgment in accepting Enron's accounting
for one of its off-balance-sheet financing vehicles."'0 0 Andersen's
acceptance of Enron's questionable accounting treatment
demonstrates a public auditor's inability to stand its ground
against the management of its audit client.' 7 The auditing team
acquiesced to Enron's concealing of losses from certain
partnerships, contrary to the professional advice of a technical
expert within Andersen's professional standards group."' "An

100. Id. at 14.
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id. at 7-8.
104. Id. at 6.
105. Ken Brown, et al., Paper Trail: Andersen Fires Partner It Says Led
Shredding of Enron Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at Al.
106. Id.
107. Further, Andersen failed to stand up to its audit client, Enron, as
evidenced by Andersen's discipline of its own employee assigned to the Enron
project. Schmidt, supra note 9, at E01. An auditor at Arthur Andersen was
removed from the Enron project when he disagreed with Enron's accounting
treatment and Enron later complained about him. Id.
108. Susan Schmidt, Tensions Flare at Trial of Andersen, Enron Auditors
Said to Have Ignored Advice, WASH. POST., May, 10, 2002, at El.
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internal Arthur Andersen document shows that as early as
November 2000, the accounting firm had concluded that Enron's
Internet services unit, which the company considered crucial to its
growth, had such poor controls that there was a 'high risk' that
financial results in the unit would be misrepresented. "01 9 During
January 2002, Arthur Andersen admitted that "employees in its
Houston office destroyed thousands of Enron documents shortly
after learning that the SEC was investigating Enron... Andersen
fired the lead partner on the Enron audits, David B. Duncan
saying that he orchestrated the shredding.""' One commentator
questioned the independence of public auditor Andersen with
respect to Enron's audit because of the substantial audit and
consulting fees paid by Enron."' In 2000, Enron paid Arthur
Andersen twenty-five million dollars in audit fees and twentyseven million dollars for nonaudit work."2 Thus, the public
auditor faces a conflict of interest, or at least a serious challenge to
its independence, in receiving audit fees from the very client that
it must evaluate.11 3
WASTE MANAGEMENT

From 1992 through 1996, Arthur Andersen issued unqualified
opinions on the financial statements of Waste Management that
overstated income by more than one billion dollars.1 At the time
Waste Management restated the financial statements, it was the
largest restatement in U.S. corporate history. 5 According to the
109. Glater & Brick, supra note 2, at Al.
110. Id.
111. Cassell Bryan-Low & Jeff D. Opdyke, How to Predict the Next Fiasco in
Accounting and Bail Early, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2002, at Cl.
112. Id.
One hundred eighty days after the newly established Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), (a new self-regulatory
organization under the SEC) begins operations, a registered public accounting
firm cannot contemporaneously provide specified non-audit services (e.g.,
consulting services) with an audit of any issuer. Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 10(A), 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (1934), amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 §§ 201(a) and (g)(2002). Section 201(g) broadly defines the prohibited
non-audit services such that a public auditor is generally prohibited from
contemporaneous performance of auditing and consulting work for the same
audit client, except for tax preparation services, which are pre-approved by the
audit committee of the audit client. Id. However, public auditors may apply
to the PCAOB for an exemption from the prohibition on simultaneous
provision of consulting and auditing services for the same client. Id.
113. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Welfare Reform for Accountants, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 2002, at A17. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 obtusely addresses the
conflict of interest by requiring the audit committee to be independent and
responsible for the appointment and oversight of public auditors, rather than
management as in the past. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(A), 15
U.S.C. 78f (1934), amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (2002).
114. Andersen Release, supra note 49.
115. Id.
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SEC Director of Enforcement, "Arthur Andersen and its partners
failed to stand up to company management and thereby betrayed
their ultimate allegiance to Waste Management's shareholders
and the investing public."'1 6 For example, in 1993 Andersen
proposed "action steps" to correct improper accounting practices,
but did not prospectively enforce Waste Management's compliance
with the action steps." 7 Further, Andersen improperly allowed
Waste Management to "bury" certain charges by netting the
charges against an unrelated, non-recurring gain."8 "Andersen
told Waste Management that its use of netting was an 'area of
SEC exposure,' but nonetheless allowed it to occur."" 9 "We [the
SEC] will not shy away from pursuing accountants and accounting
firms when they fail to live up to their responsibilities to ensure
the integrity of the financial reporting process."'' 0 Recently, the
SEC brought a new civil suit against former officers of Waste
Management."'
CAUSES OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MANIPULATION

According to an informal survey of 160 Chief Financial
Officers, a majority of C.F.O.'s had to respond to executives'
requests to misrepresent financial results.'22 Former Commissioner
Norman Johnson cited the pressure to meet analysts' expectations
as the leading cause of earnings management."' In a more
elaborate study, the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission noted that eighty-three percent of the
fraud investigations by the SEC, during a ten-year span, involved
alleged fraudulent activities of a C.F.O., a C.E.O., or both.'24 If
C.F.O.'s and their auditors miss the consensus estimates of
earnings by even one cent per share, the market capitalization of
116. Id. (quoting Richard H. Walker, the SEC's Director of Enforcement).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The Question Remains, supra note 4, at H02. The SEC filed a civil suit
against former officers of Waste Management, Inc. on Mar. 26, 2002. Id.
122. Keith H. Hammon, An Outbreak of Optimism, BUSINESS WEEK, July 13,
1998, at 108.
123. Norman Johnson, United
States Securities
and Exchange
Commissioner, Remarks at the 26th Annual Securities Regulation Institute
Conference, Current Regulatory and Enforcement Developments Affecting the
Accounting Profession (Jan. 20, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/

news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch248.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002)
[hereinafter "Johnson Securities Remarks"].
124. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(C.O.S.O.), FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1987-1997 - AN ANALYSIS OF
U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES, New York (Mar. 26, 1999), available at
http://www.coso.org/Publications/executive-summary-fraudulent-financial-re
porting.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002).
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the company may decline precipitously in response." '
The incentive to manage earnings often results from
executive compensation that is typically based on stock options.'26
The executive's stock options only have value if the stock price
increases by some minimum amount. For example, Craig Barret,
Chief Executive Officer of Intel, lawfully made over $110 million
by exercising options during 1998 because of increases in Intel's
stock price.'27
Besides executive compensation, other incentives exist for
meeting analysts' earning forecasts. Successful high technology
companies may depend upon acquisitions of other businesses to
acquire new technology and new products to compete in or to
dominate their market. The acquisitions may be financed by an
issuer's stock, which is sometimes inflated in value upon
consideration of historic price-to-earnings ratios. Accordingly, the
higher the issuer's stock price, the more acquisitions the issuer can
make. If the inflated value of the acquirer's stock is the result of
fraudulent management of earnings, and the acquired company's
stock is fairly priced, the acquirer receives an earnings
management "discount" on the acquisition. Because of this market
milieu, target companies with conservative, fair presentations of
financial statements may be threatened by the speciously
attractive deals offered by some acquirers with aggressive, turbid
presentations of their financial statements. Even absent an illadvised acquisition, if a corporation's competitors operate in the
gray area between legitimate financial reporting and fraudulent
financial reporting, the corporation faces pressure to plunder in
the gray area as well.'28
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE

With respect to the accounting firms, the SEC should address
the underlying business fundamentals that may result in lessthan-optimal independence of the public auditor. The Arthur
Young' 29 case provides an insightful view of what an ideal public
auditor should be by contrasting the role of a public auditor with
the role of an attorney. A public auditor should be a "disinterested

125. Turner Financial Remarks, supra note 39.
126. Johnson Securities Remarks, supra note 123. The chief executive
officer and the chief financial officer may forfeit or disgorge any bonus,
incentive, or equity-based compensation for the twelve-month period prior to
the filing of a materially non-compliant financial report (e.g., materially
misleading report), where a restatement of the financial report is required and
misconduct is present. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a) (2002).
127. Dean Takahashi, Intel CEO Gets $114.3 Million Exercising Options as
Bonus Falls,WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1999, at B7.
128. Levitt Financial Remarks, supra note 40.
129. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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analyst charged with public obligations", whereas an attorney
should be a "representative whose duty it is to present the client's
case in the most favorable possible light."130 Accordingly, a public
auditor should act as a "public watchdog" with "complete fidelity to
the public trust" in depicting the corporation's financial status in a
manner that is independent from the corporation's interest."31 The
auditor owes a superior duty of allegiance to the public, including
the creditors and shareholders of the corporation, rather than
corporate management. 31 2 In sum, the Court's definition of an
ideal public auditor sounds more like the description of a public
servant than an employee of a private-sector accounting firm with
paramount financial goals.
Further, Section 57, Article VI under the AICPA Code of
Professional Conduct sets forth public interest aspects of a CPA
that are consistent with the Arthur Young case. To best serve the
public interest and fulfill the ethical obligations of the AICPA and
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),13 :' the
public auditor needs a closer and cooperative relationship with the
SEC in which information is mandatorily exchanged under defined
circumstances.
Rather than using the SEC's resources merely to hold outside
auditors accountable for the transgressions inspired by a handful
of executives, the SEC and Congress should endeavor to make
public auditors more effective agents of the public interest and
barriers against financial performance manipulation. While most
executives are honest,1 4 a paucity of executives can be the source
130. Id. at 817-18. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act curtailed the permissible scope of
consulting services of auditors to promote auditor independence and because
"the accounting firm should not act as an advocate of the audit client ...."
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS
AND
TO ACCOMPANY S. 2673, PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING REFORM
INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 2002, S. REP. No. 107-205, 107TH CONG., 2D.
SESS. (July 3, 2002).
131. Arthur Young & Co, 465 U.S. at 818.
132. Id. at 817-18.
133. "Congress has yanked the AICPA's auditing oversight duties away from
it and given them a new federal board." Elizabeth MacDonald, The Man With
Nine Lives, FORBES, Nov. 25, 2002, at 60. Under the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
the new Public Accounting Oversight Board, rather than the AICPA, is
responsible for establishing or adopting ethical rules, auditing rules, quality
control rules, independence rules, and other standards that apply to "the
preparation of audit reports for issuers." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §
101(c)(2)(2002). However, the Public Accounting Oversight Board may adopt
ethical and other rules from the AICPA or "standards proposed by one or more
professional groups of accountants" that are "designated or recognized by the
Board, by rule, for such purpose." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 103(a)(1)(a)(3)(A) (2002).
134. According to Dick Grasso, Chairman and CEO of the New York Stock
Exchange, "the thousands of CEO's whom I've met in the last 35 years are as
outraged at the conduct of a few." Nightly Business Report: Interview, Dick
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of illicit financial performance manipulation because their
positions of power coalesce with their motivation stemming from
financial pressures and stock option compensation. Accordingly,
how can the SEC form a suitable barrier between the public
auditor and the unscrupulous or overly aggressive executive to
keep the executive from intentionally or unintentionally
corrupting the public auditor?
Executives arguably exert some degree of influence over
certain public auditors because of the auditor's desire to retain the
corporate client. No public auditor wants to lose the audited
client."' If the public auditor is obligated to resign from an
auditing engagement because of ethical rules, the public auditor is
faced with the likely challenge of replacing the lost business. In
the context of an accounting firm, which handles both auditing
and consulting business to the extent permitted under applicable
securities regulations, a disgruntled audited client may withdraw
its consulting business if the accounting firm resigns as the public
auditor or if other friction is present in the auditing relationship."13
"Critics are especially worked up about consulting fees auditing
firms earn from the same companies whose books they audit. But
the auditors themselves are hired, fired and paid by the very
companies they're supposed to be scrutinizing, which ought to
strike anybody as the bigger inherent conflict."'37 Under the new
regulatory regime of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the audit committee
of the audited business will have responsibility for hiring,
compensating, overseeing, and firing the public auditor, rather
than senior management. 138 However, the audit committee and its
Grasso, Chairman and CEO of the New York Stock Exchange (PBS television
broadcast, Aug. 1, 2002) (transcript of Nightly Business Report) available at
http://www.nbr.com/specials/nyseroundtable/transcript.htm (last visited Jan.

6, 2003).
135. "When auditors have reservations about a large and successful
company's books, they don't blab to the press or shout an announcement from

the rooftops, blowing a hole in a stock owned by thousands of investors. No
one would ever hire them again." Jenkins, supra note 113, at A17.
136. A registered public accounting firm cannot perform both non-audit and
audit services for the same client, unless an exception or an exemption
applies. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(A), 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (1934),
amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201 (2002). The prohibited non-

audited services are listed in section 201. Id. The PCAOB may grant an
exemption that enables the particular public auditor to do simultaneous

consulting and auditing work for the same client, if certain safeguards are
present. Id. Further, the public accounting firms can lawfully provide
auditing services and tax return preparation services for the same client. Id.
137. Jenkins, supra note 113.

138. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(A), 15 U.S.C. 78f (1934), amended
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301(2) (2002).

The audit committee

requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are somewhat consistent with the
tenor of the most recent Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations for improving
auditor independence.

Ira Millstein & John Whitehead, Committee Co-
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constituent independent directors 3 ' are paid by the audited
company and owe fiduciary duties (e.g., loyalty) to the audited
company, as opposed to the public. 4 '
For the foregoing reasons, public auditors may find it difficult
to maintain their independence from their corporate clients. For
example, if an obstreperous, strong-willed executive insists on or
advocates an aggressive accounting treatment or overreaching
accounting or auditing standards, the auditor may first try to
accommodate the executive's request within the parameters of the
accounting or auditing rules.'
However, if the auditor's
accommodation does not satisfy the executive, the only proper
recourse is to resign or contact the audit committee of the
corporation's board of directors.'42 Resigning is often too drastic a
Chairs, Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees (Feb. 8,
1999), Nasdaq Newsroom available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2002).
139. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78f (1934),
amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(3) (2002) (discussing independence
of auditors); Proposed Rule: Standards Related to Listed Company Audit
Committees, Release No. 34-47137, File No. S7-02-03 (Jan. 8, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-47137.htm (lasted visited Jan. 8,
2003) (compelling basic independence standards through the threat of delisting companies with non-compliant audit committees or boards). The New
York Stock Exchange has recently submitted new corporate governance rules
to the SEC for approval.
Rule Filing from NYSE to SEC, Corporate
Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE
Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee as Approved by
the NYSE Board of Directors August 1, 2002, (Aug. 16,2002), available at
http://www.nyse.conpdfs/corp-gov-pro-b.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2002). For
example, the new corporate governance rules require NYSE-listed companies
to have a majority of independent directors on the board and separate
meetings for independent directors and inside directors (i.e., management
directors). Id.
140. Under Delaware corporate law, the directors owe fiduciary duties to
both the corporation and its shareholders. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A2d. 805, 811
(Del. 1984).
141. Malkiel, supra note 53, at A16. "The audit partner may be loath to
make too much of a fuss about some gray area of accounting if the
intransigence is likely to jeopardize a profitable relationship from the
accounting firm." Id. Accordingly, although a director or an officer may be
liable for fraudulently influencing or coercing an auditor under section 303 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the auditor may hesitate to vilify an executive who is
merely trying to attain the best possible lawful presentation of the financial
results. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 303 (2002).
142. In practice, even prior to section 301(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, audit
committees were supposed to resolve disagreements between management
and the auditor regarding financial reporting. However, in the past insular
audit committees often convened only several times during the year and were
not adequately exposed to the financial operations of the company to be
effective watch dogs. The post-Sarbanes-Oxley audit committee may engage
advisers or consultants that are necessary to carry out its duties and exercise
due diligence over corporate financial matters pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 301(5). Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78f (1934),
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step, where a public auditor's livelihood depends on the audit
client or a "crown jewel" client.143 Contacting an audit committee
may not help if the audit committee is either inexperienced in
financial management 4 or sympathetic to the executive's view."145
Prior to the improved independence of audit committees
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and accompanying
46
the SEC proposed strengthening the
exchange listing rules,"
audit committees of corporations to counteract the self-interest of
public auditors in auditing clients.'47 In response to a recent SEC

amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301(5) (2002).
143. Malkiel, supra note 53, at A16. "Indeed, audit partners are often
compensated by how much non-audit business they can capture. They may be
incentivized, then to overlook some particularly aggressive accounting
treatment suggested by their clients." Id. Public auditor, Arthur Andersen
regarded Waste Management as a "crown jewel" client, and Andersen did not
resign in the face of accounting problems. Andersen Release, supra note 49.
144. The SEC requires each issuer "to disclose whether or not, and if not, the
reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least 1
member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined by the Commission."
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407(a)(2002).
145. "The Audit Committee needs to stick up for the outside auditor if it's
necessary against management. And we've probably all had to do that one
time or another. But that's important to, again, keeping the relationship the
way it ought to be and keeping the reporting relationship coming to the
Committee and not overly influenced by management." Securities and
Exchange Commission, Roundtable Discussion on Financial Disclosure and
Auditor Oversight , (Apr. 4, 2002) (quoting Barbara Franklin who has served
on at least one dozen audit committees), available at http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/roundtables/accountround040402.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
146. Anitha Reddy, Audit Committees Using New Power, WASH. POST., Aug.
17, 2002, at E01.
Audit committees ... have long been criticized as weak-willed watchdogs. But
after a string of corporate-finance scandals, Congress passed an accounting
oversight law and stock market officials gave the committees new powers and
The most significant change is that a company's audit
responsibilities.
committee, not its executives, must hire and fire auditors, a requirement that
has effected the balance of power between management and boards, some
directors said. Audit committees are supposed to use that new power to
ensure that auditors have no conflicts of interest, such as receiving huge
consulting fees, that might tempt them to ignore efforts by companies to cook
their books.
Id.
147. During Arthur Levitt's term as the Chairman of the SEC, the Blue
Ribbon Panel developed a plan to strengthen audit committees through NYSE
listing and NASDAQ listing rules as well as SEC rule-making procedure.
Millstein & Whitehead, supra note 138. Levitt has remarked that, "qualified,
committed, independent and tough-minded audit committees represent the
most reliable guardians of the public interest." Levitt, supra note 16.
On Feb. 8, 1999, the Blue Ribbon Panel provided a report on improving
the role of audit committees. Millstein & Whitehead, supra note 138. Some
aspects of the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations were advised over ten
years ago by the Treadway Commission, officially known as the National
Commission on Fraudulent Reporting, and prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
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2002 had not resulted in any changes to the financial reporting process. See
generally Lynn Turner, Chief Accountant, United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, Remarks at "The SEC Speaks in 1999" sponsored by
the Practising Law Institute, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 27, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch255.htm
(last visited
Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter "Turner Practising Law Remarks"].
The NYSE and the NASD sponsored the Blue Ribbon Panel, which
included executives from corporations, the NYSE, NASD, and accounting
firms. Millstein & Whitehead, supra note 138. The report addresses audit
committee membership requirements and functional aspects of the audit
committee.
A first group of recommendations proposes new NYSE and NASD listing
rules for any listed issuer regardless of market capitalization. Id. The Blue
Ribbon Panel recommended that the NYSE and the NASD require the audit
committee of each listed corporation to adopt a written charter that describes
the audit committee's authority, procedures, and membership requirements.
Id. The charter must contain the following: (1) a statement that the outside
auditors are ultimately responsible to the board of directors and the audit
committee; (2) a statement that the board of directors and the audit committee
have the power to select and replace the outside auditor; and (3) a statement
that the audit committee is responsible for obtaining and reviewing
information to ensure adequate independence of the outside auditors. Id.
The written charter must be approved by the complete board of directors
of the listed corporation and reviewed on an annual basis. Id. An auditor
replacement is typically subject to the approval of the shareholders in a proxy
statement for the annual shareholder's meeting.
A second group of recommendations proposes new NYSE and NASD
listing rules for a corporate issuer, if the issuer exceeds a minimum threshold
market capitalization of 200 million dollars. Id. First, the Blue Ribbon Panel
recommends that the NYSE and the NASD should adopt a definition of
independent directors for serving on the audit committee. Id. In general, a
director is considered sufficiently independent if the director has no
preexisting financial or familial relationship with the corporate issuer that
might interfere with the director's professional judgment, objectivity, or
otherwise constitute a conflict of interest. Id. Second, the Blue Ribbon Panel
recommends NYSE and the NASD should adopt a requirement that the audit
committee only consist of independent directors as defined. Id. Third, the
NYSE and NASD should adopt a requirement that all audit committee
members are "financially literate" and at least one member of the audit
committee have accounting or financial management expertise. Id.
A third set of recommendations proposes new SEC disclosure rules. Id.
The Blue Ribbon Panel recommended that the SEC require audit committees
for reporting companies disclose the written charter of the audit committee in
the next annual report or proxy statement during any year in which
significant changes to the written charter were made. Id. Alternately, if no
significant changes were made, the written charter must be published in the
annual report or proxy statement at least once every three years. Id. Each
proxy statement for the annual shareholders' meeting must disclose whether
or not the board has approved the written charter and whether or not the
audit committee complied with the written charter applicable during the
previous year. Id.
Further, the Blue Ribbon Panel urged the SEC to require all reporting
companies to include a letter from the audit committee in the annual report to
the shareholders and in the Form 10K annual report. The letter should state
whether or not the audit committee, after consulting with management and
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request, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has recently
proposed stricter independence requirements for audit committees,
including the absence of a present relationship with the company
and a cooling-off period of five years for certain previous
relationships.'48 Further, the SEC has required publication of the
amount paid by the audit client to the public auditor for
nonauditing work and auditing work.149 Although the SEC and
Congress have promoted various measures to improve auditor
the outside auditor, believes that the company's financial statements are fairly
presented in substantial conformance with GAAP. Id.
The Blue Ribbon Panel also recommended amending the generally
accepting auditing standards ("GAAS") to require auditors to discuss the
auditor's judgment on the clarity and quality, as opposed to merely the
acceptability, of the company's financial disclosure with the audit committee.
Turner, supra.
148.Rule Filing, supra note 140. The Sarbanes Oxley Act defines
independence of the board members of the audit committee more generally
than the proposed listing standards of the NYSE. The Sarbanes Oxley Act
requires each member of the audit committee to comply with the following two
independence requirements.
First, a board member cannot accept any
consulting, advisory, or other fee from the issuer other than in his capacity as
a board member. Sarbanes Oxley § 301(2002). Second, the board member
cannot be an affiliated person of the issuer. Sarbanes Oxley § 301(2002). The
proposed NYSE listing rules would require a majority of the board of directors
to be independent, unless an exemption applies. Rule Filing from NYSE to
SEC, Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from
the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee as
Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors August 1, 2002 (Aug. 16, 2002),
available at http://www.nyse.com (last visited on Sept. 12, 2002). The board
would need to affirmatively determine that a director has no material
relationship with the company that would comprise his independence. New
Section 303A of the Exchange's Listed Company Manual. The NYSE rules
requires a five year cooling off period before a former employee of the listed
company may qualify as an independent director. Id. The listed companies
must establish codes of business conduct and ethics for board members and
should establish an orientation program for new board members. Id. NYSE
proposed listing rules would require a nominating committee, a compensation
committee, and audit committee, each comprised of independent directors. Id.
Director's compensation must be the sole remuneration from the listed
company for audit committee members. Id. Further, non-management or
independent directors would be required to meet without management in
regular executive sessions. Id.
149. Bryan-Low & Opdyke, supra note 111, at C2. In the past, auditors
needed to disclose the following categories of fees: audit fees, financial system
fees, and all other fees. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-101(Item 9(e)(1999)). The SEC has
proposed changing the categories of the fees and requiring disclosure for the
two most recent fiscal years, instead of the single most recent fiscal year.
Strengthening
the Commission's
Requirements
Regarding Auditor
Independence, Securities Act Release No. 33-8154, Exchange Act Release No.
34-46934, File No. S7-49-02 (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/rules/
proposed/33-8154.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2002). The proposed new fee
categories include audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees, and all other fees to
be consistent with the recent restrictions on the consulting practices of
auditing firms. Id.
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independence, none of the measures adequately address the
perceived conflict-of-interest that arises from the corporation's
payment of auditing fees to the public auditor.5 0 The latest
regulatory framework continues to rely heavily on whatever
independence and oversight an audit committee can contribute to
the audit function. As a timorous precautionary measure, some
corporations recently have filed proxy statements with the SEC
that contain various controversial disclaimers for liability flowing
from the audit committee's oversight responsibilities. 51

150. Even under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a corporation hires and
pays for the auditor through the audit committee. Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2002) (as amended by Section 301(2) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The SEC has amended rule 102(e) to improve auditor
independence and the Independence Standards Board (ISB) has published a
new independence standard to improve the responsibility of auditors to the
public trust. Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commissioner's Rules of
Practice, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,164 (Oct. 26, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
201). Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice,
Release No. 33-7593, 1998 SEC LEXIS 2256 (Oct. 19, 1998). The SEC has
revised Rule 102(e) to address egregious shortfalls of independence in the
auditing context that amount to improper professional conduct. Id. The
revision to rule 102(e) increases the SEC's scope of authority in the regulation
of accountants that practice before the SEC. Perhaps, the SEC's revision to
Rule 102(e) will help fill the void left by the absence of public enforcement
activity by the AICPA. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct continues to
provide that a member who provides auditing services "should be independent
in fact and appearance." AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra
note 23, at § 55, Art. IV. The AICPA contains specific details on independence
throughout section 100 of the ACIPA Code of Professional Conduct. Id. at §
100.
The ISB published a new independence procedure in January of 1999 that
requires an auditor to provide written disclosure of a relationship to an audit
committee if the relationship involves a potential conflict of interest, an actual
conflict of interest, or otherwise might interfere the auditor's independence.
Turner Practising Law Remarks, supra note 147, at 5. The ISB considered
recommending an annual discussion between auditors and audit committees
concerning auditors' fees and independence. Turner Colorado Remarks, supra
note 57, at 7.
Besides the ISB's activities, the Public Oversight Board
established an Audit Effectiveness Committee to evaluate the effectiveness of
audits. Id.
If an auditor lacks independence when completing an audit, the financial
statements must typically be audited again by another accounting firm that is
truly independent.
Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the "Ethics Under Stress"
Conference of the American Institute of CPA's 4 (Apr. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch277.htm
(last visited
Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Turner Ethics Remarks]. In the meantime, the
company may default on loan covenants that require audited financial
statements to be completed within a certain time frame or may be unable to
complete shelf-offerings. Id.
151. Daniel Sorid, Audit Committee Disclaimer under Fire, REUTERS (Dec.
25, 2002), available at http://biz.yahoo.conrb/021225/bizauditing-1.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2002). "To some extent, this kind of language is the corporate
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One controversial way to reduce or eliminate the undesirable
influence of the corporate executive over the public auditor would
be to turn the auditing function into a government-sponsored
program of public auditors that are employees or independent
contractors of the federal government. 5 2 However, accounting
professionals and corporations might argue that a governmental
auditing program might deprive a corporation of its choice of a
particular public auditing firm with skill or experience that is
well-suited for the corporation.
Another somewhat more palatable way to reduce the
influence of the corporate executive over the public auditor would
be to authorize the self-regulatory organizations (SRO's) to select
or nominate auditors (subject to shareholder approval) for listed
companies and to fund the public auditing process through
payments to the SRO's (e.g., exchange-listing fees). Here, the selfregulatory organizations may refer to national exchanges under
53
and any registered securities
section 6 of the Exchange Act"
association under section 15A of the Exchange Act.'"4 For example,
the NYSE would be responsible for selecting and paying auditors
Similarly, the
for public audits of NYSE-listed companies.
Inc.
Regulation,
Dealers
Securities
National Association of
(NASDR), would be responsible for selecting and paying auditors
for National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System (NASDAQ) and American Stock Exchangelisted (AMEX) companies. Although fostering the greatest level of
auditor independence is a desirable goal for the long term, the
foregoing measures would require an extension of the selfregulatory responsibility of the exchanges. 155 The listing rules of
the exchanges would need to be changed to promote more effective
auditing. 156
Under the new regulatory structure of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the exchanges do not have the responsibility of hiring,
governance system pushing back a little bit and saying, 'et's be realistic here

about what you can expect from us."' Id (quoting James Gerson, Chairman of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, commenting on the
disclaimers of the audit committees).
152. Jenkins, supra note 113, at A17. "The SEC should contract directly
with accounting firms to audit books of companies that want to raise money in
the public markets." Id.
153. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000).
154. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78(o-3)(2000).
155. "In addition to direct SEC enforcement, the self regulatory
organizations - the exchanges and the NASD - can discipline [broker-dealers]

for violations of their rules. Self regulatory disciplinary actions are subject to
SEC review and, in turn, to review by a federal court of appeals." HAZEN,
supra note 27, at 461.
156. See, e.g., Millstein & Whitehead, supra note 138, at 16 (outlining the
Blue Ribbon Committee's recommendations for responsibility of auditors'
statements).
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compensating, and firing public auditors.
Instead, the
independent audit committee is responsible for hiring the public
auditor, compensating the auditor, supervising the auditor, and
resolving any disagreement between the auditor and management
on questionable accounting treatments.'1 7 If the independent audit
committee does not exercise sufficient independence from
management or if serving on an audit committee proves too
burdensome, the SEC and the exchanges should change the listing
rules to assume greater authority over the audit committee or its
responsibilities. Although Congress could amend section 10A of
the Securities and Exchange Act to mandate the deference of
companies to an SRO's selection, compensation, hiring and firing
of independent auditors,' a new SEC rule could accomplish a
similar result by merely authorizing audit committees to delegate
voluntarily any part of their selection, hiring, firing, and
compensation of the public auditor to a suitable SRO.
Under one possible regulatory scheme, the SEC, the SRO, or
both would require rotation of the assignment of an auditing firm
to a corresponding business entity on a regular basis.'
For
example, auditing assignments may be limited to maximum terms
of several years (e.g., three years), after which a mandatory
rotation would occur. The Comptroller General of the U.S. will
study the potential effects of the mandatory rotation of audit firms
and will prepare a report for the applicable congressional
committees."' If listed companies were not opposed to auditor
term limits or if the SEC mandated it, the NYSE could amend the
NYSE Listed Company Manual, sections 204.05 and 802.01, to
require the listed company to change the accounting firm that
conducts the audit at least once every several years to promote
auditor independence. 6' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, merely requires
rotation of audit partners, as opposed to audit firms, in accordance
157. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78f (1934), amended
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (2002).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Malkiel, supra note 53, at A16 (stating, "One possibility is to
require that auditing firms be changed periodically the way audit partners
within each firm are rotated.
This would incentivize auditors to be
particularly careful in approving accounting transactions for fear that leniency
would be exposed by later auditors."). A bill recently introduced by Senator
Christopher J. Dodd and Senator Jon S. Corzine would require companies to
change audit firms every four years, among other things. Jackie Spinner,
Ease Up on Accounting Curbs, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at E01. The lead
auditing partner or coordinating partner must rotate off the audit every five
years. Securities and Exchange Act § 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (1934), amended by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 203 (2002).
160. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 207 (2002).
161. NEW YORK STOCK ExCHANGE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL, available at http//www.nyse.com/listedlisteddr.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2002).
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with a five year time limit. 162 Following the financial collapse of
Enron, former Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul A. Volcker
proposed mandatory rotation of lead partners on audits on a
regular basis.163
IMPROVING FRAUD DETECTION

Aside from the issues of achieving the optimum level of
auditor independence, the SEC should facilitate expanded use of
public auditors to enhance fraud detection and financial
performance manipulation prevention. Prior to enacting section
1OA(b) of the Exchange Act, Representative (now Senator) Wyden
concluded that "[t]he problem is, under current law auditors are
not required to alert regulators regarding doubts and concerns
they have about a client's representations. This violates the spirit
of the auditor's role and leads to a wide gap between the CPA's
view of [its] responsibilities and the public perception of those

responsibilities."

164

Even after section 1OA(b) was enacted and prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley amendments to section 10A, independent auditors
6
have sometimes hesitated to engage in whistleblowing activity.'
In the Waste Management auditing engagement, the public

162. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 203 (2002). The AICPA SEC Practice
Section previously required an engagement partner of a public auditor to leave
temporarily an auditing engagement after seven years and not to return to the
auditing engagement until the expiration of two more years. American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Sec Practice Section requirements of
Members at item e, available at www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/
require.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
163. A Blow to Accounting Reform, BUS. WK., Apr. 1, 2002, at 96. Volcker
also proposed public auditing practice should be changed by severing auditing
from consulting and banning auditing firms from doing internal audits and
tax consulting. Joseph Weber, The Heavy Hand of Justice, BUS. WK., Apr. 1,
2002, at 32.
164. MARK STEVENS, THE BIG SIX 52-53 (1991).
165. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 113, at A17 (reviewing recent accounting
proposals for reform in order to police audit conduct). In April of 1998, the
management at Cendant uncovered the financial fraud of CUC International
Inc. (a predecessor of Cendant), as opposed to the independent auditors. See,
e.g., Cendant Release, supra note 56, at fn.2 (outlining Cendant's procedures
in discovery of massive financial fraud conducted by former management).
The Sarbanes-Oxley amendments to section 10A require audit committees to
keep records of complaints regarding accounting, internal controls, or auditing
and to support the confidential, anonymous submission of an employee's
concerns on questionable accounting or auditing matters. Securities and
Exchange Act § 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78f (1934), amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, § 301(4)(2002). In June of 2002, an internal auditor at WorldCom,
Cynthia Cooper, as opposed to the public auditor Andersen, informed the audit
committee about improper accounting practices that lead to uncovering $ 9
billion in accounting misstatements. Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective,
TIME, Jan. 6, 2003, at 45.
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auditor failed to stand up to the management of Waste
Management or follow their "action steps for correcting identified
accounting deficiencies" associated with the financial statements
for 1995 and 1996.166 In the auditing of American Aircraft
Corporation, the public auditor backed down to accommodate
with
treatment
associated
accounting
management's
In W.R. Grace, the auditor acquiesced to
depreciation. 11 7
management's suggested accounting treatment and justified it
based on immateriality.'68 In the Enron auditing engagement, the
public auditor approved of management's accounting treatment of
one or more questionab]e special purpose entities and the Internet
division with inadequate internal controls. 16 9 Not only did the
public auditor approve of Enron's financial statements, but the
public auditor orchestrated the shredding of documents rather
than engage
in any required whistle-blowing activity under section
0

10A.17
Congress enacted section 10A of the Exchange Act in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 10467) to enhance fraud detection in the auditing context and to
potentially reduce litigation stemming from such fraud. 17 Later,

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Andersen Release, supra note 49.
Moody Release, supra note 61.
Grace Release, supra note 56.
Jenkins, supra note 113, at A17; Glater & Brick, supra note 2, at Al.
Id.

171. Levitt Offers Views on Fraud Detection, Investment Advisers, Fund Fees,

Derivatives, 68 BNA BANKING REPORT 948 (May 19, 1997); THOMAS J. BLILEY,
COMMON SENSE LEGAL REFORMS ACT OF 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 104-50(I), 70-71
(1995) (stating the additional dissenting views of Mr. Wyden). Representative
Wyden (now Senator) explained various reasons for the auditor whistle-blower
law, including deficient auditing prior to the failures of various banks and
savings and loans. Id. The proposal of the auditor whistle-blowing law was
partially a response to the exposure of Representative Wyden and
Representative Dingell to auditing limitations reflected in the ZZZZ Best fraud
scandal, where the auditor resigned, but did not report the client's fraud to the
SEC. Id.; STEVENS, supra note 164, at 51-52.

In the ZZZZ Best fraud scandal, Ernst & Whinney refused to certify the
financial statements for the 1987 fiscal year after discovering a $7 million
dollar contract listed in ZZZZ Best's financial statement turned out to be a
sham transaction, among other things. Id. at 45-49. Ernst & Whinney
resigned as ZZZZ Best's auditor for the fiscal year dated 1987 after ZZZZ
Best's underwriter first resigned. Id. at 48. However, after Ernst & Whinney
resigned, ZZZZ Best's 8-K filed on June 17, 1987 falsely stated that "[tihere
were no disagreements between the Company and Ernst & Whinney on any
matter of accounting principles, financial statement disclosure or auditing
scope or procedure." Id. at 49-50. The public was mislead by ZZZZ Best's 8-K
for almost a month until Ernst and Whinney explained the true circumstances
in Ernst and Whinney's follow up filing with the SEC. Id. at 50. If the
whistle-blowing duty were in effect, upon the auditor's discovery of the
potential fraud on May 19, 1987 and prior to the duty to respond to ZZZZ
Best's 8-K filing, Ernst and Whinney would have reported the problem first to
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Congress passed an amendment to section 10A in the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, in which auditors are required to disclose
certain information (e.g., critical accounting policies) to an audit
committee, rather than the SEC or an SRO. The auditor whistleblowing duty of sections 1OA(b) includes three progressive stages
of auditor activity upon
the public auditor's discovery of an illegal
1 2
act during an audit.
In accordance with a first stage (section 1OA(b)(1)), if the
auditor detects or becomes aware of information, such as an
accounting irregularity, that indicates an illegal act has occurred
or may have occurred, the auditor must "adequately inform" the
appropriate level of management and the audit committee or the
board of directors of the illegal act.173 To adequately inform the
foregoing parties, the auditor determines under Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) whether the illegal act likely
has occurred and whether the illegal act would have a possible
effect on the issuer's financial statement, including any liability
for the illegal act. " 4 If the illegal act is "clearly inconsequential"in
the possible effect to the financial statement as determined by the
auditor, the auditor has no duty to inform management or the
audit committee about the illegal act. 7' Accordingly, the first stage
of the whistle-blowing rule gives the board of directors an
opportunity to correct accounting irregularities or take other
remedial action prior to any duty arising for the auditor to report
an illegality to the SEC.
After the auditor adequately informs the audit committee or
board of directors of the illegal act under the first stage, the
auditor progresses to the requirements of the second stage (section
1OA(b)(2)) of the auditor whistle-blowing law.'76 In the second
stage, the auditor must reach conclusions on whether the illegal
act has a material effect upon the financial statement of the
issuer, whether senior management has taken timely and
appropriate remedial action with respect to the illegal act, and
whether the failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected
to require deviation from a standard audit report or warrant
resignation from an audit engagement.'77 An auditor will have to
inform the company's board of directors of its conclusions in a
report as soon as possible in certain instances. The report will be
the board of directors and then to the SEC, if the company, ZZZZ Best, did not
take appropriate action.
172. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (2000).
173. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(b)(1)

(2000).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(b)(2)

(2000).
177. Id.
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mandated if the illegal act would have a material effect on the
issuer's financial statement, if the senior management has failed
to take timely and appropriate remedial action with respect to the
illegal act, and if the failure to take remedial action is reasonably
expected to require deviation from a standard audit report or is
warrant resignation from an audit engagement. 178
In a third stage (section 1OA(b)(3)), after receiving the
auditor's report, the issuer must summarize the report or provide
a copy of the report to the SEC within one business day after the
receipt of the report from the public auditor.'79 If the issuer fails to
notify the SEC of the auditor's reported conclusions within the
issuer's one day deadline, the public auditor has the duty to report
the conclusions on the illegal act to the SEC on the following day,
8
The disclosure
regardless of whether or not the auditor resigns."'
basis
to protect the
a
confidential
to the SEC may be made on
'
An
disclosure."
issuer against prejudicial or inaccurate public
auditor who reports a suspected illegality is not liable in a private
action for any conclusion or any statement made in the report
pursuant to the whistle-blowing provision. 8 ' However, a public
auditor who willfully fails to provide the requisite information to
the SEC, as opposed to the audit committee, may be subject to civil
penalties in an administrative proceeding." 3
The former Chairman of the SEC commented that section 10A
of the Exchange Act empowers auditors with "additional leverage
to influence management of a public company to correct certain
illegal acts." 84 If an audit client has obviously committed an illegal
act or fraud, section 10A arguably functions best because the
public auditor may have actual knowledge of the illegal act that
could lead to liability under the civil penalties provision of section
10A(d) or Rule 102(e).' 8' The whistle-blowing rule may be difficult
for the public auditor to apply to a potentially illegal act that is
obscured by the murky boundaries of proper accounting treatment
178. Id.
179. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 1OA(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(b)(3)

(2000).
180. Id.
181. Id. The SEC typically shares confidential information of wrong-doing
with other applicable domestic and foreign governmental regulators for
investigatory purposes. See, e.g., SEC Form 1662. The SEC would probably
try to use the confidential information that the auditor provided under the
whistle-blowing bill in the same manner.
182. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 1OA(c), 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(c)(2000).
183. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 1OA(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(d)

(2000).
184. Levitt Offers Views, supra note 171.
185. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 1OA(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(d)
(2000). Rule 102(e) provides that the SEC may suspend or permanently bar

an accountant from practicing before the SEC if the accountant willfully
violates any federal securities law. 17 C.F.R. 201.102(e) (2002).
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under GAAP. i s6 Here, the auditor may have a good faith belief or
even a negligent belief in the propriety of an aggressive accounting
technique that may fall within the purview of illicit financial
performance manipulation. Absent knowing behavior on the part
of the public auditor, the civil penalties provision of the whistleblowing law does not apply. Moreover, the civil penalties provision
of section 1OA(d) does not even apply to the auditor's knowing
failure to provide a report on an illegal act to management in the
first place under sections 1OA(b)(1) or 1OA(b)(2). 87'
Thus, the
public auditor is most concerned about disclosing willful fraud or a
concretely illegal act to the SEC, as opposed to some potential
misstatement resulting from the unintentionally misleading
portrayal of the audit client's financial position.
If the public auditor does not have compelling information on
a fraudulent or illegal act, the public auditor may be particularly
reluctant to make the momentous and grave determination that a
client or a related party has likely committed an illegal act of
material significance to the client's financial statement.188 Even
though the auditor is not personally liable for a report under
section 1OA(c), a mistaken determination of an illegal act could
catastrophically degrade the public auditor's credibility with the
board of directors and lead to considerable legal expenses for the
issuer. For example, if the public auditor jumps to the wrong
conclusion on finding an illegal act, the issuer may be forced to
defend against an elaborate SEC investigative inquiry, after which
the issuer is ultimately cleared of any wrongdoing. Thus, in the
absence of verifiable fraud or patently egregious behavior that
impacts the issuer's financial statements, the public auditor may
hesitate to invoke the auditor's ten-megaton atomic weapon under
section 10A(b) and 10A(c) that might destroy all business
relationships within its mushroom cloud. The auditor would be
unlikely to invoke section 1OA(b) and 1OA(c) and persuade the
executive management with respect to routine accounting matters

186. Malkiel writes:
"The audit partner may be loath to make too much of a fuss about some
gray area of accounting if the intransigence is likely to jeopardize a
profitable relationship for the accounting firm. Indeed, audit partners
are often compensated by how much non-audit business they can
capture. They may be incentivized, then, to overlook some particularly
aggressive accounting treatment suggested by their clients."
Malkiel, supra note 53, at A16.
187. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 1OA(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(d)

(2000).
188. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 113, at A17. "When auditors have
reservations about a large and successful company's books, they don't blab to
the press or shout an announcement from the rooftops, blowing a hole in a
stock owned by thousands of investors. No one would ever hire them again."

Id.
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or gray areas of creative accounting. For instance, the auditor
may express a preference for a conservative or a more proper
accounting treatment, but may accommodate senior management
by issuing a favorable opinion on a financial statement relying on
a borderline or arguably overly aggressive accounting treatment.
Although a registered public accounting firm must now disclose
"all alternative treatments of financial information within
generally accepted accounting principles that have been discussed
with management" and "the treatment preferred by the registered
public accounting firm" to the audit committee, it is not yet clear
whether this additional disclosure to the audit committee will
improve the auditor's ability to select any more conservative
accounting treatments than previously possible.'8 9
AUDITOR FRAUD DETECTION UNDER SAS 82
The foregoing auditor whistle-blowing law is consistent with
the improved fraud detection mechanisms provided under
Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS) No. 82. '90 SAS 82
provides guidance on fraud detection during an audit.'
The
outside auditor must first detect the likelihood of fraudulent
activity in the corporation.'92 The outside auditor may reference a
list of nonexhaustive factors provided in SAS 82 for guidance.' 3
The outside auditor then devises a plan with the appropriate level
of scrutiny and intensity
of the audit based on the evaluation of
194
the fraudulent level.
The list of risk factors for fraud in SAS 82 is particularly
practical and useful. The Public Oversight Board (POB)' 9" called

189. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 204 (2002).
190. STATEMENT OF AUDITING STANDARDS No. 82, CONSIDERATION OF
FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT AU § 316 (1997).
191. PAUL MUNTER & THOMAS A. RATCLIFFE, APPLYING GAAP AND GAAS §
28.11 (1999).
192. Id.

193. Id.
194. Id. In some cases, the auditor may resign instead of continuing with
the audit if fraud is afoot from the outset. The auditor documents the
evaluation of the fraud for the fraud detection plan. Id. The duty to devise an
appropriate plan is continuous and ongoing during the audit, so if the auditor
uncovers suspicious materials or red flags a later time during the audit, the
level of scrutiny of the audit must be increased proportionally to comply with
SAS 82. Id.
195. The Public Oversight Board (POB) is different than the recently created

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). "The Public Oversight
Board is an independent private sector body created in 1977 for overseeing
and reporting on the self-regulatory programs of the SEC Practice Section."
Public Oversight Board, Annual Report 1996-1997 at 6. SEC Practice Section
members include most accounting firms that audit publicly traded companies.
Id. The POB consistently promoted the integrity of auditing by participating
in peer review of auditing and accounting practices. Id.
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for the cataloging of specific examples of signs of fraud to enhance
detection of fraud.196 Some of the more pragmatic risk factors
include the following:
(1) "There is an excessive interest in maintaining or
increasing the entity's stock price or earnings trend through
the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices;"
(2) "Nonfinancial management excessively participates in, or
is preoccupied with, the selection of accounting principles or
the determination of significant estimates;"
(3) "Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor
auditor on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters,
including opinion shopping;"
(4) "Unreasonable demands on the auditor including
unreasonable time constraints regarding the completion of
the audit or the issuance of the auditors report;"
(5) "Domineering management behavior in dealing with the
auditor;" and
(6) "There are significant, unusual, or highly complex
transactions close to rear end that pose difficult substance
over form questions."
If fraud is detected, SAS 82 provides that the auditor must
inform the audit committee, management, or the board of the
directors, as is appropriate with the severity of the
transgression.' 9' SAS 82 contemplates that the transgression
could be reported to the SEC or another third party, if the auditor
does not violate the duty of confidentiality.'
Accordingly,
reporting an accounting irregularity to the SEC is permitted under
SAS 82 where the corporation or a control group has violated a
federal securities law, such as the internal control provision or the
books and records provision. However, SAS 82 does not mandate
such a disclosure to the SEC. In practice, such optional disclosure
to the SEC may seldom be exercised. SAS 82 is consistent with
the Public Oversight Board's conclusion that auditing performance
may be improved by improving auditing standards and practices to
detect management fraud. 200

196. PUBLIC

OVERSIGHT

BOARD,

A

SPECIAL

REPORT

OVERSIGHT BOARD OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION, AICPA
[hereinafter PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD].
197. MUNTER & RATCLIFFE, supra note 191.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 196, at 34.
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FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MANIPULATION PREVENTION

The auditor whistle-blowing provision of section 10A and SAS
82 are consistent with fulfilling the definition of the public auditor

in the Arthur Young case. However, the auditor whistle-blowing
provision and SAS 82 are generally directed more toward fraud
detection than specifically preventing financial
manipulation for overly aggressive accounting.

performance
To prevent

financial performance manipulation, a public auditor should be
obligated to report a material accounting disagreement to either
the SEC or an authorized self-regulatory organization (e.g., an
exchange or the PCAOB). This report should be made prior to
expressing an audit opinion on an annual financial report, and
should be expressed if the public auditor has been unable to
resolve the problem to his or her satisfaction with the internal
audit committee of the corporation.
Under the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an accounting firm must
report to the audit committee, as opposed to a self-regulatory
organization, all critical accounting policies and all alternative
treatments of financial information within GAAP that have been
discussed with management of the issuer.2 ° '
It would be

201. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78-j (1934), amended
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 204 (2002). The SEC has proposed new rules for
regulation S-X under the Sarbanes Oxley Act that would require the auditor to
disclose critical accounting policies to the audit committee prior to the filing of
the audit report with the SEC. Release 33-8154 (discussing proposed rule 17
CFR § 210.2-07, Communication with Audit Committees).
Prior to finalizing and filing annual reports, audit committees should
review the selection, application and disclosure of critical accounting
policies. Consistent with auditing standards, audit committees should
be apprised of the evaluative criteria used by management in their
selection of the accounting principles and methods. Proactive
discussions between the audit committee and the company's senior
management and auditor about critical accounting policies are
appropriate.
Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies,
Release No. 33-8040, 66 F.R. 65013 (Dec. 12, 2001), available at
http:www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8040.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
[A] critical accounting estimate is defined as an accounting estimate
recognized in the financial statements (1) that requires the registrant to
make assumptions about matters that are highly uncertain at the time
the accounting estimate is made and (2) for which different estimates
that the company reasonably could have used in the current period, or
changes in the accounting estimate that are reasonably likely to occur
from period to period, would have a material impact on the presentation
of the registrant's financial condition, changes in financial condition or
results of operations.
Strengthening
the
Commission's
Requirements
Regarding
Auditor
Independence, Release 33-8154, File No. S7-49-02 (Dec. 2, 2002) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8154.htm>(last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
"We recognize [ The SEC recognizes] that the complexity of financial
transactions results in accounting answers that are often the subject of
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reasonable for SEC or the PCAOB to require the audit committee
to preserve the records of the critical accounting policies,
alternative treatments, and management-auditor disagreements
in the same manner as the complaints of section 301.202 Pursuant
to section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or otherwise, the PCAOB
might later review the retained records of the critical accounting
policies, treatments, and auditor-management disagreements
during the registration process or as part of the oversight rules to

significant debate between management and the auditors. We believe
that these discussions of accounting alternatives that occur between
management and the auditors should be shared with the audit
committee in their oversight role."
Id.
Therefore, we are proposing rules requiring communication, either
orally or in writing, by auditors to audit committees of alternative
accounting treatments of financial information within GAAP that have
been discussed with management, including the ramifications of the use
of such alternative treatments and disclosures and the treatment
preferred by the accounting firm.
Id.
The "entire range of alternatives available under GAAP that were
discussed by management and the auditors would be communicated
along with the reasons for not selecting those alternatives. If the
accounting treatment selected is not the preferred method in the
auditor's opinion, we would expect that the reasons why the auditor's
preferred method was not selected by management also would be
discussed.
Id.
The Committee believes that it is important for the audit committee to
be aware of key assumptions underlying a company's financial
statements and of disagreements that the auditor has with
management. The audit committee should be informed in a timely
manner of such disagreements, so that it can independently review
them and intervene if it chooses to do so in order to assure the integrity
of the audit.
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS
TO ACCOMPANY S. 2673, PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING REFORM
AND
INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 2002, S. REP. NO. 107-205, 107TH CONG., 2D.
SESS. (July 3, 2002).

202. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1934), amended
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 204 (2002). The Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board may establish rules that require the retention of records for
inspection purposes. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(e) (2002). The Oversight
Board must require registered public accounting firms (1) to prepare and
maintain audit work papers and other papers related to audits for a period of
not less than seven years and (2) to provide a concurring or second partner
review and approval of the audit report. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 103(a)(2)(A)
(2002). The SEC's proposed rules ask for comments on "should the auditor be
required to provide the communication in writing" to the audit committee.
Strengthening
the Commission's
Requirements
Regarding Auditor
Independence, Securities Act Release No. 33-8154, Exchange Act Release No.
34-46934, File No. S7-49-02 (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/rules/
proposed/33-8154.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
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be adopted to ensure accurate disclosure of the reported financial
statements.2 °3 The proposed disagreement reporting duty would
eliminate the above circuitous route of communication between the
auditor and the PCAOB. This may lead to the public disclosure of
inaccurate information in financial reports by the time the PCAOB
has the opportunity to review the retained records. °4
The proposed disagreement reporting duty would be
consistent with the ethical duties of a certified 2public accountant
00
under the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct.
Interpretation 102-4 of the AICPA Code provides that in
situations where there is a dispute, members need to make a
judgment regarding the materiality of the misrepresentation
[in a financial statement or recording of a transaction] in
light of existing authority. If, in the member's judgment,
material misrepresentations do exist, the member is
obligated to bring it to the attention of the appropriate level
of management. In the most extreme cases, members should
consider disclosure to third parties or discontinuing
employment.2 0
The disagreement reporting duty should extend beyond
material misrepresentations covered by Interpretation 102-4 to
questionable or creative accounting treatments that lie in the gray
areas where allegations of fraud might later arise if financial
performance of the corporation deteriorates.
The foregoing proposed disagreement reporting duty would
apply to the public auditor, as opposed to the issuer. The new
disagreement reporting duty would go beyond the present
commentary 7 of the public auditor in rebuttal to an issuer's filing
a Form 8-K, which relates to the resignation or termination of the
public auditor.0 0 The public auditor would be encouraged to

203. Section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 authorizes the Oversight
Board to conduct inspections of public accounting firms. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act authorizes the Oversight Board to establish or adopt auditing, quality
control ethics and other standards related to the preparation of audit reports.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 103(a)(2)(A) (2002).
204. The SEC has expressed concern that the public auditor's disclosure of
critical accounting policies to the audit committee should occur prior to
finalizing and filing annual reports with the SEC. Strengthening the
Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Securities Act
Release No. 33-8154, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46934, File No. S7-49-02
(Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8154.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2003).
205. AICPA

CODE

OF

PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT,

supra

note

23,

at

Interpretation 102-4.
206. Yesner Initial Release, supra note 76, at n.36.
207. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. 229.304(a)(3) (2002).
208. The present Form 8-K filing procedure should remain intact to cover
situations where the public auditor resigns or is terminated. Under the
present system, an issuer must file a Form 8-K within five days of the
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communicate the substance of such a disagreement to the SEC or
an authorized self-regulatory organization (e.g., the PCAOB)
because the auditor would not be required to make any serious
determination of an illegal act or fault of the audited client as
presently required under section 10A. Similarly, few auditors
would relish accusing an executive of violating section 303 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that requires a finding of fraudulent
influence, coercion, manipulation or misleading of the auditor." 9
Further, by eliminating the impediment of the auditor's sacrificial
resignation, the public auditor may routinely disclose such a
disagreement to the SEC or the self-regulatory organization before
annual financial statements are filed and publicly available. The
SEC, PCAOB, or another self-regulatory agency would intervene
by providing one or more disinterested accounting experts (e.g.,
selected AICPA members) to resolve disagreements on overly
aggressive accounting, creative accounting, auditing tactics, or
otherwise, that are problematic, but do not prompt the public
auditor to resign or to report the client under the whistle-blowing
law.
A similar, but broader, definition of "disagreement," which
presently applies to the Form 8-K context, should apply to the
public auditor's new reporting duty on a disagreement.
Accordingly, a disagreement may pertain to "[a] matter of
accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure,
Further, a disagreement
or auditing scope or procedure.""'
excludes any initial problem that was resolved to the auditor's
satisfaction.2"' The engagement partner or another signatory on
resignation or dismissal of the public accountant. SEC Form 8-K (B(1) of
"General Instructions" B(1) and Item 4 of "Information to Be Included in the
Report." Although the present scheme allows the accountant to present its
conflicting view in 200 words or less for inclusion in the annual report, proxy
statement or information statement if the accountant believes the issuers
Form 8-K is incomplete or incorrect, such an auditor's statement is too little,
too late to help prevent financial performance manipulation. Regulation S-K,
17 C.F.R. 229.304(b)(2) (2000). Moreover, the public cannot depend on the
public auditor to resign to trigger the contingent Form 8-K reporting duty in
the first place. Although a disagreement, in the auditing context, might
indicate an accompanying incident of creative accounting, an auditor, a mere
legal novice, may readily overlook the disagreement as not concerning a
reportable illegality under the whistle-blowing rule. Thus, the proposed
disagreement reporting duty appropriately complements the scope of the
whistle-blowing rule to prevent financial performance manipulation.
209. Sarbaes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 303 (2002). "It shall be unlawful ... for any
officer or director of an issuer ... to take any action to fraudulently influence,
coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public or certified accountant
engaged in the performance of an audit ... for the purpose of rendering such
financial statements materially misleading." Id.
210. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. 229.304(b)(3) and Instruction 4 (2002).
Here, the definition of a
211. Id. at 229.304(b)(5) and Instruction 4.
"disagreement" may include the disclosure required under section 204 of the
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the audit report should make the decision on whether a
disagreement is actually present.2 '

The auditor would need to report an unresolved material
disagreement if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor might consider the disclosure of the disagreement to the
SEC, the PCAOB, or the self-regulatory organization important in
maintaining accurate financial reporting on his investment. Thus,
the public auditor may have a duty to report a material accounting
disagreement regardless of whether the auditor's report ultimately
represents an unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, a
disclaimer, or an adverse opinion so long as an unresolved
material disagreement is present before issuing the annual audit
report and filing the Form 10-K. The foregoing definition of
materiality is broader than the existing Form 8-K reporting
standard which merely defines a disagreement as material if a
disagreement is "not resolved to the satisfaction" of the auditor
and if the disagreement "would have caused" the public auditor "to
make reference to the subject matter of the disagreement in
connection with its report."2 13
Application of the disagreement reporting rule could have
preemptively diffused the auditing dilemmas faced by the public
auditors in the American Aircraft Corporation (A.A.C.)
administrative proceeding, the Waste Management settlement,
and W. R. Grace litigation before the misleading information was
ever filed in the respective financial statements. If the proposed
disagreement reporting rule were present, the public auditors of
A.A.C., Waste Management, and W. R. Grace would arguably not
have succumbed to the desires of strong-willed management, but
rather fulfilled their mandatory duty to report such a
disagreement to the SEC or its authorized self-regulatory
organization without the disincentive of resignation from an
auditing engagement or reporting the audit client as the
perpetrator of an illegal act.
With respect to Enron, if the public auditor, Arthur Andersen,
was aware of special purpose entities associated with the audited
issuer that may be perceived as concealing debt of an issuer, the
public auditor could readily report the problem under the
disagreement reporting duty without determining that the issuers
conduct was illegal or violated applicable accounting standards.
Thus, the disagreement reporting rule could lead to a potential
reduction in enforcement activity of the SEC and less
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and any applicable SEC rules thereunder. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (2002). Further, "disagreement"
may incorporate the scope of "disagreement" under applicable auditing
standards. Auditing Standard AU § 380.
212. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. 229.304 (b)(4) and Instruction 5.
213. Id. at Instruction 4.
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repercussions for shareholders of various publicly traded
corporations.214 As a policy matter, the SEC and any selfregulatory organization thereunder should use the confidentiality
section 105(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to protect the
confidentiality of information in a manner that elicits full
disclosure of accounting problems by whistleblowers and rapid
resolution of the problems through timely and accurate public
disclosure to the market.2 1
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

The proposed, expanded supervision of public auditors by a
self-regulatory organization authorized by the SEC and the
proposed disagreement reporting duty (amendment to section 10A
or establishment of a corresponding PCAOB rule) represent
prophylactic measures intended to increase market transparency
and reduce the need for future SEC enforcement activity.
However, the SEC should continue to hold C.E.O.'s and C.F.O.'s
accountable by bringing actions against unscrupulous earnings
management, particularly for non-listed securities. As illustrated
by SEC enforcement activity, the SEC can effectively tailor
surgical strikes in enforcement activities by targeting the minority
of executives themselves that engage in improper earnings
management, rather than the underlying companies.216 A study
from Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission indicates the SEC has routinely taken enforcement
action for fraudulent financial reporting against executives in
small corporations that were not listed on the NYSE or AMEX
exchanges. 17
The Supreme Court has stated that "if investors were to view
the auditor as an advocate for the corporate client, the value of the
audit function itself might be lost." 18 The SEC has pursued
various cases on auditor independence during the last several
years."1
Several SEC enforcement actions reflect a lack of
adherence to basic independence standards. For example, a public
auditor cannot audit a client while negotiating employment with
the client.2 ° A public auditor cannot work as an employee of the
214. Harvey Pitt, Former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, indicated the SEC did not want to play "gotcha", but wanted to
protect investors by proactively solving disclosure problems that might
damage shareholders. Hilzenrath, supra note 12, at A25.
215. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105(b)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
216. The ultimate goal should be to protect the investor or the shareholder,
as opposed to targeting the corporation in enforcement activity that financially
harms the shareholder.
217. FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, supra note 124.
218. U.S. v. Young, 465 U.S. 805, 819 n.15 (1984).
219. Schuetze SEC Remarks, supra note 46.
220. Norman S. Johnson, Commissioner, United States Securities and
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entity the auditor is auditing.221A public auditor cannot audit his
or her own bookkeeping.22
The AICPA has been criticized for keeping disciplinary
proceedings against accountants out of the public view.223 As a
result, the SEC has made an effort to grab the headlines in
enforcement activities against accountants to show that
accountants are truly accountable. In a recent settlement against
PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P., the SEC fined the firm 2.5
million dollars because numerous accounting personnel had
invested in the stock of PriceWaterhouseCooper's audit clients.
The SEC's goal was to persuade PriceWaterhouseCoopers "to
educate the accounting profession about the importance of the
Commission's independence rules."224
CONCLUSION

Investors may lose confidence in the U.S. equity markets if
changes in financial reporting do not take place to illuminate true
financial conditions. 2
The SEC has warned of a corrosive
deterioration of U.S. market leadership because of the current
prevalent gimmickry and attendant reduced transparency of
financial reporting.2 If investors are unaware of the true financial
conditions of corporations, the investors are not able to allocate
their capital in a rational and efficient manner. Thus, more
capital might be allocated to a poorly performing business than
otherwise might be. Conversely, less capital may be available for
truly meritorious corporations that present their financial records
fairly. The SEC, alone or with Congressional legislation, should
authorize exchanges to hire and fire public auditors for listed
corporations to foster proper supervision over the post-SarbanesOxley audit committees. The SEC could limit the self-regulatory
authorization of the exchanges by imposing term limits or

Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Practicing Law Institute's SEC Speaks
(Feb. 26, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1999/spch264.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002).
221. Id.

222. Id.
223. See generally Turner, supra note 54.
224. Johnson, supra note 220. If the SEC is unable to bring sufficient
improvements in financial performance on the proposed auditor disagreement
reporting duty by amending section 10A of the Exchange Act, Congress should
extend a private right of action for aiding and abetting liability once again to
auditors to over-rule the controversial Central Bank v. Denver Supreme Court
decision. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994). Such Congressional action should be carefully considered as it
might spur the type of frivolous class-action lawsuits that Reform Act of '95
was designed to keep in check.
225. See generally Levitt, supra note 16.

226. Id.
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rotational requirements for the public auditors auditing of any
single listed corporation.
Congress or the recently formed PCAOB 2 7 should ensure
auditors fulfill their auditing obligations to the public by enacting
appropriate legislation or rules for the protection of investors and
the integrity of the equity markets. For example, section 10A of
the Exchange Act could be amended or the upcoming PCAOB rules
could be crafted to include the proposed disagreement reporting
duty. The public auditor needs a routine procedure, to follow for
safeguarding market integrity, that does not require the public
auditor's sacrificial resignation or the public auditor's extremely
grave determination of a reportable illegality when faced with a
disagreement with management, the audit committee, or both over
This proposed disagreement
accounting or auditing issues.
reporting duty provides an expedient route to the SEC or an SRO
thereunder for the public auditor to comply with applicable
securities regulations and ethical rules. Presently, the public
auditor is required to struggle slowly over an arduous footpath
through the jungle of the audit committee review, resignation,
confidentiality, and section 10A "illegal acts" to fulfill the auditor's
public responsibilities. The auditor disagreement reporting duty
would allow the SEC or an authorized SRO to interact quickly and
constructively with issuers to prevent misleading numbers from
being filed in financial statements in the first place. The SEC
would have an interactive opportunity to resolve matters of overly
aggressive accounting from the outset without resorting to
enforcement activity that might adversely impact the investments
of blameless shareholders. Thus, if the foregoing improvement to
the Exchange Act or applicable rules thereunder were adopted,
public confidence in the equity markets would be enhanced
without escalation of the SEC's enforcement resources.

227. The Public Accounting Oversight board will have five financially
literate members that are appointed by the SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 101(a), (e)(1), (e)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002). The Oversight Board will
establish or adopt auditing, quality control, ethics and other standards related
to the preparation of audit reports. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 at § 103(a)(1).

